https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:28:08 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-12703 bdu:2026-12703 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-12703 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-78682 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Current NLTK source reopens SSRF in proxied environments. `pathsec.urlopen()` validates the requested hostname locally, but once proxy inheritance is enabled the real fetch is performed by the proxy rather than by the validated direct-connect socket path.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Server-side request forgery - **Affected component:** `nltk.pathsec.urlopen`, `nltk.data.load`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.index`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download` - **Affected versions:** Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was a negative control and did not reproduce. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Proxy-handler inheritance disables `_SafeHTTPHandler` and `_SafeHTTPSHandler`, so the validated hostname no longer matches the actual egress destination.</p> <p>The hardened direct path pins the validated numeric destination IP before opening the socket. The proxied branch instead copies `ProxyHandler` instances from the global opener, marks the request as proxied, and skips the pinned handlers. I confirmed that a validated public URL can be fetched from a loopback-only internal service through the proxy path via `pathsec.urlopen()`, `nltk.data.load()`, `Downloader.index()`, and `Downloader.download()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The runtime has an HTTP proxy configured and the caller relies on `pathsec` to keep network fetches SSRF-safe.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Start a loopback-only HTTP server that serves secret text, a valid downloader index…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Current NLTK source reopens SSRF in proxied environments. `pathsec.urlopen()` validates the requested hostname locally, but once proxy inheritance is enabled the real fetch is performed by the proxy rather than by the validated direct-connect socket path.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Server-side request forgery - **Affected component:** `nltk.pathsec.urlopen`, `nltk.data.load`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.index`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download` - **Affected versions:** Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was a negative control and did not reproduce. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Proxy-handler inheritance disables `_SafeHTTPHandler` and `_SafeHTTPSHandler`, so the validated hostname no longer matches the actual egress destination.</p> <p>The hardened direct path pins the validated numeric destination IP before opening the socket. The proxied branch instead copies `ProxyHandler` instances from the global opener, marks the request as proxied, and skips the pinned handlers. I confirmed that a validated public URL can be fetched from a loopback-only internal service through the proxy path via `pathsec.urlopen()`, `nltk.data.load()`, `Downloader.index()`, and `Downloader.download()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The runtime has an HTTP proxy configured and the caller relies on `pathsec` to keep network fetches SSRF-safe.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Start a loopback-only HTTP server that serves secret text, a valid downloader index…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-78682 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358796 EUVD-2026-358796 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358796 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-78682 <p>NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.</p> <p>NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-78682 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6ww7-3frv-cqxh <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Current NLTK source reopens SSRF in proxied environments. `pathsec.urlopen()` validates the requested hostname locally, but once proxy inheritance is enabled the real fetch is performed by the proxy rather than by the validated direct-connect socket path.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Server-side request forgery - **Affected component:** `nltk.pathsec.urlopen`, `nltk.data.load`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.index`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download` - **Affected versions:** Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was a negative control and did not reproduce. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Proxy-handler inheritance disables `_SafeHTTPHandler` and `_SafeHTTPSHandler`, so the validated hostname no longer matches the actual egress destination.</p> <p>The hardened direct path pins the validated numeric destination IP before opening the socket. The proxied branch instead copies `ProxyHandler` instances from the global opener, marks the request as proxied, and skips the pinned handlers. I confirmed that a validated public URL can be fetched from a loopback-only internal service through the proxy path via `pathsec.urlopen()`, `nltk.data.load()`, `Downloader.index()`, and `Downloader.download()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The runtime has an HTTP proxy configured and the caller relies on `pathsec` to keep network fetches SSRF-safe.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Start a loopback-only HTTP server that serves secret text, a valid downloader index…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Current NLTK source reopens SSRF in proxied environments. `pathsec.urlopen()` validates the requested hostname locally, but once proxy inheritance is enabled the real fetch is performed by the proxy rather than by the validated direct-connect socket path.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Server-side request forgery - **Affected component:** `nltk.pathsec.urlopen`, `nltk.data.load`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.index`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download` - **Affected versions:** Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was a negative control and did not reproduce. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Proxy-handler inheritance disables `_SafeHTTPHandler` and `_SafeHTTPSHandler`, so the validated hostname no longer matches the actual egress destination.</p> <p>The hardened direct path pins the validated numeric destination IP before opening the socket. The proxied branch instead copies `ProxyHandler` instances from the global opener, marks the request as proxied, and skips the pinned handlers. I confirmed that a validated public URL can be fetched from a loopback-only internal service through the proxy path via `pathsec.urlopen()`, `nltk.data.load()`, `Downloader.index()`, and `Downloader.download()`.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The runtime has an HTTP proxy configured and the caller relies on `pathsec` to keep network fetches SSRF-safe.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Start a loopback-only HTTP server that serves secret text, a valid downloader index…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6ww7-3frv-cqxh https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3733 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3733 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73987 <p>golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary Code Execution via Eval Injection in Collocations Module undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy keras: Keras: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in archive extraction utilities sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity guardrails-detectors: guardrails-detectors: Unauthenticated Regular-Expression…</p> <p>golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary Code Execution via Eval Injection in Collocations Module undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy keras: Keras: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in archive extraction utilities sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity guardrails-detectors: guardrails-detectors: Unauthenticated Regular-Expression…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73987