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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:07:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407399</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407399</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407399</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407399</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-77433</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77433</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. From 16.1 until 16.2, the account confirmation page’s incomplete validation of the next parameter accepts protocol-relative URLs because the version 16.1 fix for CVE-2026-54724 only requires the value to start with a slash. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a confirmation URL on a trusted Kiwi TCMS hostname that redirects a user to an external site, enabling phishing and related downstream confidentiality or integrity impacts when the user follows the link. This issue is fixed in version 16.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. From 16.1 until 16.2, the account confirmation page’s incomplete validation of the next parameter accepts protocol-relative URLs because the version 16.1 fix for CVE-2026-54724 only requires the value to start with a slash. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a confirmation URL on a trusted Kiwi TCMS hostname that redirects a user to an external site, enabling phishing and related downstream confidentiality or integrity impacts when the user follows the link. This issue is fixed in version 16.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77433</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gcwf-c25f-p9rv — Kiwi TCMS account confirmation open redirect through protocol-relative URLs</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcwf-c25f-p9rv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: kiwitcms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated `next` parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses `startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like `//evil.com` which start with `/` but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py`, the `Confirm` view (line ~113):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
        self.url = self.request.GET.get(&amp;#34;next&amp;#34;, reverse(&amp;#34;core-views-index&amp;#34;))
        if not self.url.startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;):
            self.url = reverse(&amp;#34;core-views-index&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The check `startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` passes for `//evil.com` because it begins with `/`, but browsers interpret `//evil.com` as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to `https://evil.com` (or `http://evil.com` depending on the current page&amp;#39;s protocol).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GET /confirm/&amp;lt;activation_key&amp;gt;/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1
    Host: kiwi.example.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Response:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTP/1.1 302 Found
    Location: //evil.com/phishing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The browser follows the redirect to `https://evil.com/phishing`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verification:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; url = &amp;#34;//evil.com/phishing&amp;#34;
    &amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; url.startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
    True  # passes the check!&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: kiwitcms&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated `next` parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses `startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like `//evil.com` which start with `/` but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py`, the `Confirm` view (line ~113):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
        self.url = self.request.GET.get(&amp;#34;next&amp;#34;, reverse(&amp;#34;core-views-index&amp;#34;))
        if not self.url.startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;):
            self.url = reverse(&amp;#34;core-views-index&amp;#34;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The check `startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` passes for `//evil.com` because it begins with `/`, but browsers interpret `//evil.com` as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to `https://evil.com` (or `http://evil.com` depending on the current page&amp;#39;s protocol).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GET /confirm/&amp;lt;activation_key&amp;gt;/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1
    Host: kiwi.example.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Response:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HTTP/1.1 302 Found
    Location: //evil.com/phishing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The browser follows the redirect to `https://evil.com/phishing`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verification:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; url = &amp;#34;//evil.com/phishing&amp;#34;
    &amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; url.startswith(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
    True  # passes the check!&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcwf-c25f-p9rv</guid>
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