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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:25:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-373880</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373880</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-373880</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373880</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-77249</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions uses the module-level requests.get function instead of the fetcher&amp;#39;s protected session. A caller-controlled public Jira URL can redirect that unhooked request to an internal address, bypassing the redirect checks added for CVE-2026-27826. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions, requests.get, self.jira._session.get, and _make_ssrf_safe_hook, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions uses the module-level requests.get function instead of the fetcher&amp;#39;s protected session. A caller-controlled public Jira URL can redirect that unhooked request to an internal address, bypassing the redirect checks added for CVE-2026-27826. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions, requests.get, self.jira._session.get, and _make_ssrf_safe_hook, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v9m3-wfh8-5646 — MCP Atlassian:  Incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: redirect-based SSRF via unhooked requests session in Jira user-…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v9m3-wfh8-5646</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for the SSRF vulnerability tracked as GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 / CVE-2026-27826 is incomplete. That fix added two defenses: validate_url_for_ssrf() on the per-request X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers (blocking a directly-internal base URL), and a redirect-validation hook (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) attached to the fetcher&amp;#39;s HTTP session so that an attacker-controlled public host cannot redirect outbound requests to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, one outbound request path does not go through the hooked session. JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions issues its request with the module-level requests.get instead of self.jira._session.get, so the redirect-validation hook never runs for it. An unauthenticated attacker (in the HTTP / multi-tenant transport mode that binds 0.0.0.0 with no credentials) can therefore set a public base URL that passes validate_url_for_ssrf(), then have their own server return an HTTP redirect to an internal address. The bare requests.get follows that redirect with no validation, resulting in a blind server-side request to an arbitrary internal host and port.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;src/mcp_atlassian/jira/users.py, method _lookup_user_by_permissions (the requests.get(...) call):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;url = f&amp;#34;{self.config.url}/rest/api/2/user/permission/search&amp;#34;
    params = {&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;: username, &amp;#34;permissions&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;BROWSE&amp;#34;}
    ...
    response = requests.get(           # module-level requests, NOT self.jira._session
        url,
        params…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for the SSRF vulnerability tracked as GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 / CVE-2026-27826 is incomplete. That fix added two defenses: validate_url_for_ssrf() on the per-request X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers (blocking a directly-internal base URL), and a redirect-validation hook (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) attached to the fetcher&amp;#39;s HTTP session so that an attacker-controlled public host cannot redirect outbound requests to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, one outbound request path does not go through the hooked session. JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions issues its request with the module-level requests.get instead of self.jira._session.get, so the redirect-validation hook never runs for it. An unauthenticated attacker (in the HTTP / multi-tenant transport mode that binds 0.0.0.0 with no credentials) can therefore set a public base URL that passes validate_url_for_ssrf(), then have their own server return an HTTP redirect to an internal address. The bare requests.get follows that redirect with no validation, resulting in a blind server-side request to an arbitrary internal host and port.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;src/mcp_atlassian/jira/users.py, method _lookup_user_by_permissions (the requests.get(...) call):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;url = f&amp;#34;{self.config.url}/rest/api/2/user/permission/search&amp;#34;
    params = {&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;: username, &amp;#34;permissions&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;BROWSE&amp;#34;}
    ...
    response = requests.get(           # module-level requests, NOT self.jira._session
        url,
        params…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v9m3-wfh8-5646</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4100 — MCP Atlassian:  Incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: redirect-based SSRF via unhooked requests session in Jira user-…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4100</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for the SSRF vulnerability tracked as GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 / CVE-2026-27826 is incomplete. That fix added two defenses: validate_url_for_ssrf() on the per-request X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers (blocking a directly-internal base URL), and a redirect-validation hook (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) attached to the fetcher&amp;#39;s HTTP session so that an attacker-controlled public host cannot redirect outbound requests to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, one outbound request path does not go through the hooked session. JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions issues its request with the module-level requests.get instead of self.jira._session.get, so the redirect-validation hook never runs for it. An unauthenticated attacker (in the HTTP / multi-tenant transport mode that binds 0.0.0.0 with no credentials) can therefore set a public base URL that passes validate_url_for_ssrf(), then have their own server return an HTTP redirect to an internal address. The bare requests.get follows that redirect with no validation, resulting in a blind server-side request to an arbitrary internal host and port.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;src/mcp_atlassian/jira/users.py, method _lookup_user_by_permissions (the requests.get(...) call):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;url = f&amp;#34;{self.config.url}/rest/api/2/user/permission/search&amp;#34;
    params = {&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;: username, &amp;#34;permissions&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;BROWSE&amp;#34;}
    ...
    response = requests.get(           # module-level requests, NOT self.jira._session
        url,
        params…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mcp-atlassian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for the SSRF vulnerability tracked as GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 / CVE-2026-27826 is incomplete. That fix added two defenses: validate_url_for_ssrf() on the per-request X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers (blocking a directly-internal base URL), and a redirect-validation hook (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) attached to the fetcher&amp;#39;s HTTP session so that an attacker-controlled public host cannot redirect outbound requests to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, one outbound request path does not go through the hooked session. JiraUserMixin._lookup_user_by_permissions issues its request with the module-level requests.get instead of self.jira._session.get, so the redirect-validation hook never runs for it. An unauthenticated attacker (in the HTTP / multi-tenant transport mode that binds 0.0.0.0 with no credentials) can therefore set a public base URL that passes validate_url_for_ssrf(), then have their own server return an HTTP redirect to an internal address. The bare requests.get follows that redirect with no validation, resulting in a blind server-side request to an arbitrary internal host and port.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;src/mcp_atlassian/jira/users.py, method _lookup_user_by_permissions (the requests.get(...) call):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;url = f&amp;#34;{self.config.url}/rest/api/2/user/permission/search&amp;#34;
    params = {&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;: username, &amp;#34;permissions&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;BROWSE&amp;#34;}
    ...
    response = requests.get(           # module-level requests, NOT self.jira._session
        url,
        params…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4100</guid>
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