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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-409004</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409004</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409004</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409004</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-75522</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75522</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior to 0.8.1, src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts ChainBuilder.tryBuild() terminates chain construction when an attacker-controlled certificate Subject Distinguished Name equals a trusted anchor subject, without verifying cryptographic closure to the anchor public key. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a self-signed leaf or intermediate that reuses the trusted Subject Distinguished Name and have credentials signed by the attacker key accepted as issued by the trusted authority. The public src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts TrustEvaluator.evaluate() path compounds the error by matching a terminus through serialNumber and falling back to anchors[0], which can attribute the forged chain to genuine trusted-authority metadata. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior to 0.8.1, src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts ChainBuilder.tryBuild() terminates chain construction when an attacker-controlled certificate Subject Distinguished Name equals a trusted anchor subject, without verifying cryptographic closure to the anchor public key. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a self-signed leaf or intermediate that reuses the trusted Subject Distinguished Name and have credentials signed by the attacker key accepted as issued by the trusted authority. The public src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts TrustEvaluator.evaluate() path compounds the error by matching a terminus through serialNumber and falling back to anchors[0], which can attribute the forged chain to genuine trusted-authority metadata. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75522</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc — OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verify…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4c2f-96cf-f5fc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @openeudi/openid4vp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ChainBuilder` (the private RFC 5280 validator behind `TrustEvaluator` and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on **Subject Distinguished Name string equality** rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor&amp;#39;s Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus **with no signature verification** against the anchor&amp;#39;s public key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor&amp;#39;s Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A relying party using `@openeudi/openid4vp` to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a **forged credential as genuine**, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through the public verification path: `TrustEvaluator.evaluate()` returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor&amp;#39;s metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts`, `tryBuild()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify &amp;amp; climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain;  // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The si…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @openeudi/openid4vp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ChainBuilder` (the private RFC 5280 validator behind `TrustEvaluator` and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on **Subject Distinguished Name string equality** rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor&amp;#39;s Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus **with no signature verification** against the anchor&amp;#39;s public key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor&amp;#39;s Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A relying party using `@openeudi/openid4vp` to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a **forged credential as genuine**, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through the public verification path: `TrustEvaluator.evaluate()` returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor&amp;#39;s metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts`, `tryBuild()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify &amp;amp; climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain;  // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The si…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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