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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:07:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-moto-CVE-2026-75508 — GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-75508</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: moto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The parser&amp;#39;s `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: moto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The parser&amp;#39;s `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-75508</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-395103</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395103</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-395103</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395103</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-75508</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75508</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser&amp;#39;s max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser&amp;#39;s max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75508</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8 — GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r77w-qph3-7vf8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The parser&amp;#39;s `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The parser&amp;#39;s `max_tokens` limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a `max_tokens` check of any size while still allocating one `Token`
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with `max_tokens=5` in force.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Lexer.lookahead()` reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a `Token` object, and linked into the persistent token list via
`token.next` / `token.prev` — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Parser.advance_lexer()` incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
`max_tokens` bounded only the *non-comment* tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe `max_tokens`
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (`# c\n` repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r77w-qph3-7vf8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:95872 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.5.3 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives @fastify/static: @fastify/static: Information disclosure via route guard bypass fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol extract-zip: extract-zip: Arbitrary file write via symlink in archive encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal find-my-way: find-my-way: Denial of Service vulnerability in HTTP/2 server systeminformation: systeminformation: Arbitrary Command Execution via OS Command Injection mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file write via FileStore path traversal mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers nltk: NLTK: Information Disclosure via Symlink Sandbox Bypass github.com/klauspost/compress: klauspost/compress: Denial of Service via integer overflow in dictionary processing com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names accelerate: Hugging Face Accelerate: Path Traversal and Denial of Service via weight_map brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Ser…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives @fastify/static: @fastify/static: Information disclosure via route guard bypass fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol extract-zip: extract-zip: Arbitrary file write via symlink in archive encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal find-my-way: find-my-way: Denial of Service vulnerability in HTTP/2 server systeminformation: systeminformation: Arbitrary Command Execution via OS Command Injection mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file write via FileStore path traversal mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers nltk: NLTK: Information Disclosure via Symlink Sandbox Bypass github.com/klauspost/compress: klauspost/compress: Denial of Service via integer overflow in dictionary processing com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names accelerate: Hugging Face Accelerate: Path Traversal and Denial of Service via weight_map brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Ser…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-75508</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-75508</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.10: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser&amp;#39;s max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.10: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser&amp;#39;s max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-75508</guid>
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