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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 14:18:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-74650</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74650</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74650</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1090 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1090</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-359856</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359856</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-359856</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-359856</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-74650</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74650</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
&amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
&amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74650</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-96vf-829x-rg43</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96vf-829x-rg43</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
&amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
&amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96vf-829x-rg43</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-74650 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74650</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-74650</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74650</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74650</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74650</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler() WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE. The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer. The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with &amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 239 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler() WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE. The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6, so it requires pIE-&amp;gt;length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE-&amp;gt;data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer. The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with &amp;#34;pIE-&amp;gt;length == WLAN_WMM_LEN&amp;#34;. Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE-&amp;gt;length.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74650</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2970 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2970</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2970</guid>
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