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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:45:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-74621</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74621</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74621</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1090 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1090</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-358521</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358521</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-358521</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358521</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-74621</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74621</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing
anything to the defragmentation engine:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	else
		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	if (err || !frag)
		return err;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;
tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of
them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the
ownership-transfer exit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag);
	if (err)
		goto out_frag;
	...
out_frag:
	if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common);
	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller
frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The
skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per
malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented
for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be
queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by
nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still ow…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing
anything to the defragmentation engine:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	else
		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	if (err || !frag)
		return err;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;
tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of
them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the
ownership-transfer exit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag);
	if (err)
		goto out_frag;
	...
out_frag:
	if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common);
	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller
frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The
skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per
malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented
for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be
queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by
nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still ow…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74621</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pjmq-j37r-3mm4</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjmq-j37r-3mm4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing
anything to the defragmentation engine:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	else
		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	if (err || !frag)
		return err;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;
tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of
them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the
ownership-transfer exit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag);
	if (err)
		goto out_frag;
	...
out_frag:
	if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common);
	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller
frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The
skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per
malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented
for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be
queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by
nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still ow…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing
anything to the defragmentation engine:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	else
		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag);
	if (err || !frag)
		return err;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;
tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of
them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the
ownership-transfer exit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag);
	if (err)
		goto out_frag;
	...
out_frag:
	if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common);
	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller
frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The
skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per
malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented
for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be
queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by
nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still ow…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjmq-j37r-3mm4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-74621 — net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74621</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-74621</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74621</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74621</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74621</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing anything to the defragmentation engine: 	if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4) 		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag); 	else 		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag); 	if (err || !frag) 		return err; tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM; tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it. tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the ownership-transfer exit: 	err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag); 	if (err) 		goto out_frag; 	... out_frag: 	if (err != -EINPROGRESS) 		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common); 	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED; TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens. Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still owned by u…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ct: fix sk_buff leak when the header checks reject a packet tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing anything to the defragmentation engine: 	if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4) 		err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag); 	else 		err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &amp;amp;frag); 	if (err || !frag) 		return err; tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM; tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it. tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the ownership-transfer exit: 	err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p-&amp;gt;zone, &amp;amp;defrag); 	if (err) 		goto out_frag; 	... out_frag: 	if (err != -EINPROGRESS) 		tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&amp;amp;c-&amp;gt;common); 	return TC_ACT_CONSUMED; TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens. Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still owned by u…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74621</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2970 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2970</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2970</guid>
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