<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 15:21:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-74430</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74430</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74430</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354227</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354227</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354227</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354227</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-74430</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74430</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
     has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may
     still happen).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
     first packet is transmitted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
     that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     reply to be received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
     has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may
     still happen).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
     first packet is transmitted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
     that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     reply to be received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74430</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-px3f-ghhp-7f3w</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-px3f-ghhp-7f3w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
     has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may
     still happen).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
     first packet is transmitted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
     that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     reply to be received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
     has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may
     still happen).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
     first packet is transmitted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
     that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the
     reply to be received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-px3f-ghhp-7f3w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74430</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74430</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:  (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates      that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as      yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything      has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the      stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may      still happen).      The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned      a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the      first packet is transmitted.      RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate      that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the      reply to be received.  (2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks      that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx      buffe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call-&amp;gt;tx_top is zero and call-&amp;gt;tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:  (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates      that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as      yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything      has been transmitted at least once, but we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the      stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK&amp;#39;d (retransmissions may      still happen).      The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned      a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the      first packet is transmitted.      RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate      that all Tx packets have been ACK&amp;#39;d and we&amp;#39;re now waiting for the      reply to be received.  (2) As per Wyatt Feng&amp;#39;s original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks      that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx      buffe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74430</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
