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  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 04:12:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-74257</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74257</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-74257</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354137</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354137</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354137</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354137</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-74257</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74257</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock,
but its processing is lockless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise
multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited
commit removed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not
an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
 udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84
 inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]
 sock_re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock,
but its processing is lockless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise
multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited
commit removed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not
an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
 udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84
 inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]
 sock_re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-74257</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9q9r-2g23-7q72</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9q9r-2g23-7q72</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock,
but its processing is lockless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise
multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited
commit removed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not
an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
 udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84
 inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]
 sock_re…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock,
but its processing is lockless.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise
multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited
commit removed it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not
an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428
 udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84
 inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]
 sock_re…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9q9r-2g23-7q72</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-74257 — sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74257</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-74257</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-74257</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-74257</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74257</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg() syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0] sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock, but its processing is lockless. Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg. For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock. Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited commit removed it. Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg(). Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026 Call Trace:  &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;  dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]  print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482  kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595  sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428  udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84  inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]  sock_recvmsg+0x1a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sockmap: Fix use-after-free in udp_bpf_recvmsg() syzbot reported use-after-free of struct sk_msg in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0] sk_msg_recvmsg() peeks sk_msg from psock-&amp;gt;ingress_msg under a lock, but its processing is lockless. Thus, sk_msg_recvmsg() must be serialised by callers, otherwise multiple threads could touch the same sk_msg. For example, TCP uses lock_sock(), and AF_UNIX uses unix_sk(sk)-&amp;gt;iolock. Initially, udp_bpf_recvmsg() had used lock_sock(), but the cited commit removed it. Let&amp;#39;s serialise sk_msg_recvmsg() with lock_sock() in udp_bpf_recvmsg(). Note that holding spin_lock_bh(&amp;amp;sk-&amp;gt;sk_receive_queue.lock) is not an option due to copy_page_to_iter() in sk_msg_recvmsg(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88814cdcf000 by task syz.0.24/6020 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6020 Comm: syz.0.24 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/13/2026 Call Trace:  &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;  dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]  print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482  kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595  sk_msg_recvmsg+0xb54/0xc30 net/core/skmsg.c:428  udp_bpf_recvmsg+0x4bd/0xe00 net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c:84  inet_recvmsg+0x260/0x270 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:891  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1078 [inline]  sock_recvmsg+0x1a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-74257</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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