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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 17:56:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-408915</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408915</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-408915</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408915</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73864</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73864</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;install-artifact-from-github installs prebuilt native artifacts hosted by GitHub without compiling them locally. Prior to 1.7.0, bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a native .node artifact, allows RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR to select a source, follows HTTP redirects including HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, and writes the decompressed response to the artifact path without cryptographic integrity verification before writing or loading it. An attacker who controls a configured mirror, replaces a release asset, or can modify plaintext transport can supply native code that executes when the consumer loads the artifact. Version 1.7.0 adds SHA-256 verification for default-GitHub-source downloads when the consuming package publishes an artifactHashes bag; configured mirrors and packages without a bag remain outside that verification.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;install-artifact-from-github installs prebuilt native artifacts hosted by GitHub without compiling them locally. Prior to 1.7.0, bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a native .node artifact, allows RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR to select a source, follows HTTP redirects including HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, and writes the decompressed response to the artifact path without cryptographic integrity verification before writing or loading it. An attacker who controls a configured mirror, replaces a release asset, or can modify plaintext transport can supply native code that executes when the consumer loads the artifact. Version 1.7.0 adds SHA-256 verification for default-GitHub-source downloads when the consuming package publishes an artifactHashes bag; configured mirrors and packages without a bag remain outside that verification.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73864</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 — install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88q3-gch3-5396</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: install-artifact-from-github&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon&amp;#39;s native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected code (v1.6.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:
  ```js
  let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || &amp;#39;https://github.com&amp;#39;;
  ```
  `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:
  ```js
  const write = async (name, data) =&amp;gt; {
    await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});
    await fsp.writeFile(name, data);   // `data` is the raw HTTP response body
  };
  ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:
  ```js
  const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: install-artifact-from-github&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon&amp;#39;s native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected code (v1.6.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:
  ```js
  let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || &amp;#39;https://github.com&amp;#39;;
  ```
  `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:
  ```js
  const write = async (name, data) =&amp;gt; {
    await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});
    await fsp.writeFile(name, data);   // `data` is the raw HTTP response body
  };
  ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:
  ```js
  const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88q3-gch3-5396</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-73864</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-73864</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-re2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(install-artifact-from-github installs prebuilt native artifacts hosted ...)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-re2, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-re2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(install-artifact-from-github installs prebuilt native artifacts hosted ...)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-73864</guid>
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