<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 13:36:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-envoy-2026-73552 — Envoy: HTTP RBAC safe_regex can fail open on RFC-valid obs-text header values</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-envoy-2026-73552</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: envoy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy HTTP RBAC accepts RFC-valid opaque header bytes but evaluates safe_regex values with RE2&amp;#39;s UTF-8 subject semantics. A downstream client can preserve a prohibited marker and add an unrelated obs-text octet, causing RE2::FullMatch to return false and a negative RBAC policy to treat the invalid subject as an ordinary no-match. A byte-oriented route matcher can still observe the marker, allowing the request to reach a route intended to be denied. The relevant scope boundary is that plain positive ALLOW regexes normally fail closed, and exact, prefix, suffix, and contains matchers are not shown to have this subject-domain failure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: envoy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy HTTP RBAC accepts RFC-valid opaque header bytes but evaluates safe_regex values with RE2&amp;#39;s UTF-8 subject semantics. A downstream client can preserve a prohibited marker and add an unrelated obs-text octet, causing RE2::FullMatch to return false and a negative RBAC policy to treat the invalid subject as an ordinary no-match. A byte-oriented route matcher can still observe the marker, allowing the request to reach a route intended to be denied. The relevant scope boundary is that plain positive ALLOW regexes normally fail closed, and exact, prefix, suffix, and contains matchers are not shown to have this subject-domain failure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-envoy-2026-73552</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-373630</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373630</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-373630</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373630</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73552</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73552</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy HTTP RBAC accepts RFC-valid opaque header bytes but evaluates safe_regex values with RE2&amp;#39;s UTF-8 subject semantics. A downstream client can preserve a prohibited marker and add an unrelated obs-text octet, causing RE2::FullMatch to return false and a negative RBAC policy to treat the invalid subject as an ordinary no-match. A byte-oriented route matcher can still observe the marker, allowing the request to reach a route intended to be denied. The relevant scope boundary is that plain positive ALLOW regexes normally fail closed, and exact, prefix, suffix, and contains matchers are not shown to have this subject-domain failure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy HTTP RBAC accepts RFC-valid opaque header bytes but evaluates safe_regex values with RE2&amp;#39;s UTF-8 subject semantics. A downstream client can preserve a prohibited marker and add an unrelated obs-text octet, causing RE2::FullMatch to return false and a negative RBAC policy to treat the invalid subject as an ordinary no-match. A byte-oriented route matcher can still observe the marker, allowing the request to reach a route intended to be denied. The relevant scope boundary is that plain positive ALLOW regexes normally fail closed, and exact, prefix, suffix, and contains matchers are not shown to have this subject-domain failure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73552</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11630-1 — istioctl-1.30.4-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11630-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;istioctl-1.30.4-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;istioctl-1.30.4-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11630-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:65106 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 3.0.15</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:65106</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal net/http/httputil: golang: net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy forwards hidden query parameters, potentially bypassing security controls envoy: envoy: ext_authz use-after-free after rejecting an HTTP request net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages envoy: envoy: path matching bypass via per-segment parameters not stripped by router envoy: envoy: HTTP/2 trailers without END_STREAM in oghttp2 cause heap use-after-free envoy: envoy: stored XSS through dynamically generated stat names in admin interface envoy: envoy: ext_authz crash on CONNECT requests without :path pseudo-header envoy: envoy: connection poisoning through generic non-WebSocket HTTP upgrade requests envoy: envoy: scoped IPv6 handling crash for HTTP/3 clients in original DST clusters envoy: envoy: HTTP/2 memory exhaustion via discarded Host headers not counted in limits envoy: envoy: path normalization bypass via dot/dot-dot segments with parameters envoy: envoy: RBAC safe_regex fails to match non-UTF-8 HTTP header values e…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal net/http/httputil: golang: net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy forwards hidden query parameters, potentially bypassing security controls envoy: envoy: ext_authz use-after-free after rejecting an HTTP request net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages envoy: envoy: path matching bypass via per-segment parameters not stripped by router envoy: envoy: HTTP/2 trailers without END_STREAM in oghttp2 cause heap use-after-free envoy: envoy: stored XSS through dynamically generated stat names in admin interface envoy: envoy: ext_authz crash on CONNECT requests without :path pseudo-header envoy: envoy: connection poisoning through generic non-WebSocket HTTP upgrade requests envoy: envoy: scoped IPv6 handling crash for HTTP/3 clients in original DST clusters envoy: envoy: HTTP/2 memory exhaustion via discarded Host headers not counted in limits envoy: envoy: path normalization bypass via dot/dot-dot segments with parameters envoy: envoy: RBAC safe_regex fails to match non-UTF-8 HTTP header values e…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:65106</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
