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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 22:00:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354738</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354738</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354738</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354738</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73410</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73410</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts pinned a validated address through a Node agent, but the REST integration used getDispatcher from packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts, causing undici to ignore that agent and resolve the hostname again. A builder could use DNS rebinding to make packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts connect to an internal address after a public address passed validation, with full response access and arbitrary REST methods. The fix adds createPinnedLookup support to the undici dispatcher and passes the validated address to custom fetch implementations. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts pinned a validated address through a Node agent, but the REST integration used getDispatcher from packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts, causing undici to ignore that agent and resolve the hostname again. A builder could use DNS rebinding to make packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts connect to an internal address after a public address passed validation, with full response access and arbitrary REST methods. The fix adds createPinnedLookup support to the undici dispatcher and passes the validated address to custom fetch implementations. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73410</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435 — Budibase: SSRF via DNS rebinding in the REST datasource integration</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v42f-v8xc-j435</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Budibase&amp;#39;s central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**&amp;#39;s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname&amp;#39;s DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
**The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Budibase&amp;#39;s central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**&amp;#39;s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname&amp;#39;s DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
**The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v42f-v8xc-j435</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2483 — Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2483</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, SQL-Injection durchzuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Konten zu übernehmen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen sowie einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Budibase ausnutzen, um erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, SQL-Injection durchzuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Konten zu übernehmen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen sowie einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2483</guid>
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