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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 14:15:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72420</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72420</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72420</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354085</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354085</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354085</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354085</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72420</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72420</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and .. one possible scenario is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU1                            CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-&amp;gt; handle sh2
-&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL
-&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                raid5_make_request()
                                -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true
				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap
				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true
                                -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by :
- Expand the protect zone.
- Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock.
- Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,
  any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either:
	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()
	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and .. one possible scenario is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU1                            CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-&amp;gt; handle sh2
-&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL
-&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                raid5_make_request()
                                -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true
				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap
				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true
                                -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by :
- Expand the protect zone.
- Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock.
- Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,
  any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either:
	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()
	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72420</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3f2p-v853-3w76</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3f2p-v853-3w76</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and .. one possible scenario is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU1                            CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-&amp;gt; handle sh2
-&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL
-&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                raid5_make_request()
                                -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true
				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap
				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true
                                -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by :
- Expand the protect zone.
- Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock.
- Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,
  any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either:
	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()
	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and .. one possible scenario is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU1                            CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-&amp;gt; handle sh2
-&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL
-&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
-&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                raid5_make_request()
                                -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true
				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap
				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true
                                -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
                                -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)
                                -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)
-&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by :
- Expand the protect zone.
- Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock.
- Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,
  any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either:
	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()
	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3f2p-v853-3w76</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-72420 — md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-72420</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-72420</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-72420</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3707 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with
page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that
rxe_set_page() is called with mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size step increments, but the
page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing
PAGE_SIZE of memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i&amp;amp;gt;=1 either
a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous
or
b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size aligned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) page_size &amp;amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):
   ibmr-&amp;amp;gt;iova = 0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with
page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that
rxe_set_page() is called with mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size step increments, but the
page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing
PAGE_SIZE of memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i&amp;amp;gt;=1 either
a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous
or
b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size aligned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) page_size &amp;amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):
   ibmr-&amp;amp;gt;iova = 0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72420</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72420</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request() on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op).. and .. one possible scenario is: CPU1                            CPU2 break_stripe_batch_list(sh1) -&amp;gt; handle sh2 -&amp;gt; lock(sh2) -&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2) -&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags) -&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)                                 raid5_make_request()                                 -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true 				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap 				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true                                 -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)                                 -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags) -&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever... Fix by : - Expand the protect zone. - Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock. - Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,   any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either: 	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps() 	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request() on sh-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op).. and .. one possible scenario is: CPU1                            CPU2 break_stripe_batch_list(sh1) -&amp;gt; handle sh2 -&amp;gt; lock(sh2) -&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2) -&amp;gt; test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags) -&amp;gt; wake_up_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)                                 raid5_make_request()                                 -&amp;gt; add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; lock(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true 				   batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap 				   exist bio on sh2 -&amp;gt; true                                 -&amp;gt; set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags)                                 -&amp;gt; unlock(sh2)                                 -&amp;gt; wait_on_bit(sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags) -&amp;gt; sh2-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags = sh1-&amp;gt;dev[i].flags &amp;amp; ~R5_Overlap No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever... Fix by : - Expand the protect zone. - Use batch_head&amp;#39;s device flag&amp;#39;s snaphot when no held head_sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock. - Move sh/head_sh-&amp;gt;batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,   any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh-&amp;gt;stripe_lock now either: 	- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps() 	  under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72420</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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