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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 18:52:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72418</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72418</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72418</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354083</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354083</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354083</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354083</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72418</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72418</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add
was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid
connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting
scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in
the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry
is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add()
assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from
the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up
the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count
drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection
of the perfectly valid new connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state
checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage
collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This
allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets
or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted
without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained
to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add
was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid
connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting
scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in
the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry
is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add()
assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from
the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up
the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count
drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection
of the perfectly valid new connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state
checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage
collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This
allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets
or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted
without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained
to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72418</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-prxp-6xjx-9qx5</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-prxp-6xjx-9qx5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add
was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid
connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting
scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in
the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry
is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add()
assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from
the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up
the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count
drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection
of the perfectly valid new connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state
checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage
collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This
allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets
or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted
without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained
to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add
was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid
connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting
scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in
the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry
is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add()
assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from
the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up
the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count
drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection
of the perfectly valid new connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state
checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage
collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This
allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets
or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted
without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained
to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-prxp-6xjx-9qx5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72418</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72418</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting scenarios. The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add() assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST. Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection of the perfectly valid new connection. Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly. This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured local…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 189 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct Commit 69894e5b4c5e (&amp;#34;netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add was skipped&amp;#34;) introduced a regression where packets for valid connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting scenarios. The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add() assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from the loopback interface, it should skip the addition and return -EEXIST. Skipping the addition triggers a garbage collection run that cleans up the TIME_WAIT connection. Consequently, the active connection count drops to 0, which xt_connlimit mishandles, leading to the false rejection of the perfectly valid new connection. Fix this by replacing the interface check with protocol-agnostic state checks. We now skip the tree insertion and preserve the lockless garbage collection optimization only if the connection is IPS_ASSURED. This allows early-confirmed setup packets (such as reused TIME_WAIT sockets or locally generated SYN-ACKs) to be properly evaluated and counted without falsely dropping. The goto check_connections path is maintained to ensure these setup packets are deduplicated correctly. This has been tested with slowhttptest and HTTP server configured local…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72418</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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