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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:05:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72398</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72398</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1203 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoq…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1203</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1203</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1203</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354068</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354068</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354068</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354068</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72398</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72398</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-59hc-5687-r27h</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59hc-5687-r27h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59hc-5687-r27h</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-72398 — sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-72398</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-72398</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-72398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3707 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with
page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that
rxe_set_page() is called with mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size step increments, but the
page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing
PAGE_SIZE of memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i&amp;amp;gt;=1 either
a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous
or
b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size aligned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) page_size &amp;amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):
   ibmr-&amp;amp;gt;iova = 0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.(CVE-2026-31668)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with
page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that
rxe_set_page() is called with mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size step increments, but the
page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing
PAGE_SIZE of memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i&amp;amp;gt;=1 either
a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous
or
b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-&amp;amp;gt;page_size aligned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) page_size &amp;amp;lt; PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):
   ibmr-&amp;amp;gt;iova = 0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21910-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23881-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72398</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72398</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and reconstructs the original INIT chunk. When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification is safe. However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data. Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook()) when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is freed and the packet is discarded. Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT chunk. Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and reconstructs the original INIT chunk. When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification is safe. However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data. Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook()) when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is freed and the packet is discarded. Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT chunk. Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk-&amp;gt;chunk_end, since the INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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