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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 12:34:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72343</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72343</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72343</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1164 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1164</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1164</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1164</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354034</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354034</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354034</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354034</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72343</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72343</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with
priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
    stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire
    format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guar…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with
priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
    stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire
    format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guar…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72343</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4xw9-57x7-f4g8</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4xw9-57x7-f4g8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with
priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
    stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire
    format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guar…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with
priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
    stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire
    format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guar…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4xw9-57x7-f4g8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21910-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72343</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72343</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:   - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that     returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and     use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().   - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on     stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire     format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled     by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handl…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The &amp;#34;if (!buf)&amp;#34; guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes &amp;#34;successfully&amp;#34; with priv-&amp;gt;stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv-&amp;gt;stats_nch &amp;gt; 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv-&amp;gt;max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:   - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that     returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and     use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().   - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on     stats_nch) for the worker&amp;#39;s active payload size, so the wire     format (block-&amp;gt;rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled     by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handl…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72343</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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