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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 13:51:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-72237</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72237</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72237</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1163 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1163</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1163</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1163</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-356365</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356365</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-356365</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356365</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72237</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72237</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries
such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses
are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level
filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm()
only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege
levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from
address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to
also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose
branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries
such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses
are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level
filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm()
only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege
levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from
address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to
also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose
branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72237</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wcfv-p978-69xf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wcfv-p978-69xf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries
such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses
are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level
filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm()
only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege
levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from
address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to
also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose
branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries
such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses
are in the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E.g.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \
        perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
        perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \
        grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-
  0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-
  ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level
filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm()
only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege
levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from
address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to
also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose
branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wcfv-p978-69xf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72237</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72237</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g.   $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \         perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \         perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \         grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;   ...   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-   ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g.   $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \         perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \         perf script -i - -F brstack|tr &amp;#39; &amp;#39; &amp;#39;\n&amp;#39;| \         grep -E &amp;#39;0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}&amp;#39;   ...   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//-   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//-   0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//-   ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72237</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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