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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 12:41:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-72205 — CVE-2026-72205 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72205</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354835</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354835</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354835</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354835</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72205</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72205</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via
kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount
failure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via
    load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in
    ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through
    ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is
    not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the
    fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()
    failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in
    unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,
    so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach
the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is
jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these
resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of
recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the
inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super()
skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
warning is emitted either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via
kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount
failure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via
    load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in
    ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through
    ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is
    not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the
    fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()
    failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in
    unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,
    so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach
the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is
jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these
resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of
recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the
inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super()
skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
warning is emitted either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cx24-8ppf-cvpr</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cx24-8ppf-cvpr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via
kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount
failure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via
    load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in
    ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through
    ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is
    not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the
    fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()
    failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in
    unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,
    so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach
the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is
jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these
resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of
recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the
inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super()
skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
warning is emitted either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via
kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount
failure:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via
    load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in
    ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through
    ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is
    not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the
    fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()
    failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in
    unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,
    so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach
the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is
jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these
resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of
recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the
inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super()
skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
warning is emitted either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Move…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cx24-8ppf-cvpr</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72205</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72205</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount failure:   - vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via     load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in     ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.   - vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through     ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is     not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the     fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()     failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.   - vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in     unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,     so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup. Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super() skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION warning is emitted either. Move the pe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: free volume-wide resources on fill_super failure ntfs_fill_super()&amp;#39;s err_out_now path frees only the volume struct via kfree(vol), leaving several vol-owned allocations behind on every mount failure:   - vol-&amp;gt;nls_map, loaded by ntfs_init_fs_context() via     load_nls_default() (or replaced by an explicit nls= option in     ntfs_parse_param()), is never unload_nls()&amp;#39;d.   - vol-&amp;gt;volume_label, allocated by load_system_files() through     ntfs_ucstonls() once the $Volume name attribute has been parsed, is     not released by load_system_files()&amp;#39;s own error labels nor by the     fill_super() inline cleanup that only runs on d_make_root()     failure.  Any later failure inside load_system_files() leaks it.   - vol-&amp;gt;lcn_empty_bits_per_page was kvfree()&amp;#39;d in     unl_upcase_iput_tmp_ino_err_out_now without clearing the pointer,     so it could not be folded into a single common cleanup. Because the failure paths never call ntfs_volume_free() and never reach the d_make_root() inline cleanup block (it sits above the label and is jumped over by the load_system_files() / kvmalloc failure gotos), these resources accumulate per failed mount attempt with no chance of recovery short of unloading the module.  This is a silent leak: the inodes loaded prior to failure remain hashed but generic_shutdown_super() skips evict_inodes() when sb-&amp;gt;s_root is unset, so no CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION warning is emitted either. Move the pe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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