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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:12:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-72112 — CVE-2026-72112 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-353941</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353941</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-353941</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353941</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side
(ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv
unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past
BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be
registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring
via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the
same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE
calls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has
none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown
(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so
the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing
into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A
later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling
ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed
executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()
does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side
(ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv
unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past
BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be
registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring
via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the
same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE
calls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has
none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown
(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so
the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing
into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A
later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling
ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed
executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()
does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wgmw-xwr6-63ww</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wgmw-xwr6-63ww</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side
(ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv
unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past
BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be
registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring
via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the
same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE
calls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has
none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown
(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so
the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing
into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A
later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling
ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed
executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()
does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side
(ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv
unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past
BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be
registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring
via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the
same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE
calls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has
none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown
(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so
the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing
into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A
later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling
ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed
executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()
does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wgmw-xwr6-63ww</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 93 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side (ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE calls. The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown (io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON. Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg() does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 93 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side (ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-&amp;gt;priv unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring via fget(ops-&amp;gt;ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE calls. The second registration passes the ctx-&amp;gt;bpf_ops check (the new ctx has none) and overwrites ops-&amp;gt;priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown (io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-&amp;gt;priv, so the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step keeps pointing into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling ctx-&amp;gt;loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON. Reject registration when ops-&amp;gt;priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg() does for its struct_ops.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um root Rechte zu erlangen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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