https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:29:05 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355503 EUVD-2026-355503 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355503 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70667 <p>Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.3, _validate_revocation_url in lemur/certificates/verify.py checked the original CRL or OCSP URL but the later request could reach a different destination. The CRL requests.get call followed HTTP redirects without validating each Location target, so a public attacker-controlled URL could redirect to loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or instance-metadata addresses. Validation and connection also performed separate DNS resolutions, creating a time-of-check time-of-use window for DNS rebinding on both CRL and OCSP paths. An operator uploading a certificate through POST /api/1/certificates/upload could therefore induce blind internal requests despite the earlier mitigation. The fix disables redirects and pins validated addresses while preserving the correct Host value. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.3.</p> <p>Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.3, _validate_revocation_url in lemur/certificates/verify.py checked the original CRL or OCSP URL but the later request could reach a different destination. The CRL requests.get call followed HTTP redirects without validating each Location target, so a public attacker-controlled URL could redirect to loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or instance-metadata addresses. Validation and connection also performed separate DNS resolutions, creating a time-of-check time-of-use window for DNS rebinding on both CRL and OCSP paths. An operator uploading a certificate through POST /api/1/certificates/upload could therefore induce blind internal requests despite the earlier mitigation. The fix disables redirects and pins validated addresses while preserving the correct Host value. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70667 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f3qq-49m6-rw8f <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lemur</p> <p>## Summary The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 (`_validate_revocation_url()` in `lemur /certificates/verify.py`) can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations (RFC1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254) during verification.</p> <p>## Affected version Tested against `main` (the commit that introduced `_validate_revocation_url`). The 1.9.2 release predates that guard and is vulnerable to the original SSRF (GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95) directly; this bypass applies to the unreleased mitigation in `main`. Please map the affected range to whichever release will first contain `_validate_revocation_url`.</p> <p>## Bypass 1 — HTTP redirect (deterministic) The guard validates only the URL in the certificate; the CRL fetch then follows redirects without re-validating the target: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:174 response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) ``` The attacker hosts the CRL URL on a public host they control (passes the guard); that host returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`. `requests` follows it to the internal target the guard never inspected.</p> <p>## Bypass 2 — DNS rebinding / TOCTOU (probabilistic) The guard resolves once during validation; the fetch re-resolves independently: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:51 addr = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(hostname)) ```</p> <p>A low-TTL attacker name that answers a public IP…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lemur</p> <p>## Summary The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 (`_validate_revocation_url()` in `lemur /certificates/verify.py`) can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations (RFC1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254) during verification.</p> <p>## Affected version Tested against `main` (the commit that introduced `_validate_revocation_url`). The 1.9.2 release predates that guard and is vulnerable to the original SSRF (GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95) directly; this bypass applies to the unreleased mitigation in `main`. Please map the affected range to whichever release will first contain `_validate_revocation_url`.</p> <p>## Bypass 1 — HTTP redirect (deterministic) The guard validates only the URL in the certificate; the CRL fetch then follows redirects without re-validating the target: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:174 response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) ``` The attacker hosts the CRL URL on a public host they control (passes the guard); that host returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`. `requests` follows it to the internal target the guard never inspected.</p> <p>## Bypass 2 — DNS rebinding / TOCTOU (probabilistic) The guard resolves once during validation; the fetch re-resolves independently: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:51 addr = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(hostname)) ```</p> <p>A low-TTL attacker name that answers a public IP…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f3qq-49m6-rw8f https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3676 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lemur</p> <p>## Summary The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 (`_validate_revocation_url()` in `lemur /certificates/verify.py`) can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations (RFC1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254) during verification.</p> <p>## Affected version Tested against `main` (the commit that introduced `_validate_revocation_url`). The 1.9.2 release predates that guard and is vulnerable to the original SSRF (GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95) directly; this bypass applies to the unreleased mitigation in `main`. Please map the affected range to whichever release will first contain `_validate_revocation_url`.</p> <p>## Bypass 1 — HTTP redirect (deterministic) The guard validates only the URL in the certificate; the CRL fetch then follows redirects without re-validating the target: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:174 response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) ``` The attacker hosts the CRL URL on a public host they control (passes the guard); that host returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`. `requests` follows it to the internal target the guard never inspected.</p> <p>## Bypass 2 — DNS rebinding / TOCTOU (probabilistic) The guard resolves once during validation; the fetch re-resolves independently: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:51 addr = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(hostname)) ```</p> <p>A low-TTL attacker name that answers a public IP…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lemur</p> <p>## Summary The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 (`_validate_revocation_url()` in `lemur /certificates/verify.py`) can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations (RFC1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254) during verification.</p> <p>## Affected version Tested against `main` (the commit that introduced `_validate_revocation_url`). The 1.9.2 release predates that guard and is vulnerable to the original SSRF (GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95) directly; this bypass applies to the unreleased mitigation in `main`. Please map the affected range to whichever release will first contain `_validate_revocation_url`.</p> <p>## Bypass 1 — HTTP redirect (deterministic) The guard validates only the URL in the certificate; the CRL fetch then follows redirects without re-validating the target: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:174 response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) ``` The attacker hosts the CRL URL on a public host they control (passes the guard); that host returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...`. `requests` follows it to the internal target the guard never inspected.</p> <p>## Bypass 2 — DNS rebinding / TOCTOU (probabilistic) The guard resolves once during validation; the fetch re-resolves independently: ```python # lemur/certificates/verify.py:51 addr = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(hostname)) ```</p> <p>A low-TTL attacker name that answers a public IP…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3676