https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 13:38:46 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348583 EUVD-2026-348583 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348583 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70486 <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 until 0.11.0, the terminal file-preview serveUrl iframe branch always granted allow-same-origin together with allow-scripts for HTML files served from the application origin. Any authenticated user with access to a configured terminal server could cause script in a previewed file to run in the Open WebUI origin, read the victim&#39;s session token from localStorage, and take over the account, with possible server-side code execution if the victim was an admin or held workspace.functions. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.</p> <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 until 0.11.0, the terminal file-preview serveUrl iframe branch always granted allow-same-origin together with allow-scripts for HTML files served from the application origin. Any authenticated user with access to a configured terminal server could cause script in a previewed file to run in the Open WebUI origin, read the victim&#39;s session token from localStorage, and take over the account, with possible server-side code execution if the victim was an admin or held workspace.functions. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70486 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3xpf-xq7r-v8c5 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The HTML file preview rendered terminal-served files in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and the file is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script in a previewed file could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal server, no admin rights. - No victim interaction beyond having the chat open: a `display_file` tool call opens the preview automatically. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset, which is the default. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through it was not exposed, since those headers are merged into every proxied response including the served file. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected branch ignored it entirely.</p> <p>## Impact The previewed document runs in the application origin, so it can reach the parent window, read the session token out of `localStorage` and exfiltrate it, which is full account takeover of the victim. If the vic…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The HTML file preview rendered terminal-served files in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and the file is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script in a previewed file could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal server, no admin rights. - No victim interaction beyond having the chat open: a `display_file` tool call opens the preview automatically. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset, which is the default. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through it was not exposed, since those headers are merged into every proxied response including the served file. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected branch ignored it entirely.</p> <p>## Impact The previewed document runs in the application origin, so it can reach the parent window, read the session token out of `localStorage` and exfiltrate it, which is full account takeover of the victim. If the vic…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3xpf-xq7r-v8c5 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3641 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The HTML file preview rendered terminal-served files in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and the file is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script in a previewed file could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal server, no admin rights. - No victim interaction beyond having the chat open: a `display_file` tool call opens the preview automatically. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset, which is the default. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through it was not exposed, since those headers are merged into every proxied response including the served file. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected branch ignored it entirely.</p> <p>## Impact The previewed document runs in the application origin, so it can reach the parent window, read the session token out of `localStorage` and exfiltrate it, which is full account takeover of the victim. If the vic…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary Any authenticated user with access to a terminal server could get script of their choosing to run in the Open WebUI origin itself. The HTML file preview rendered terminal-served files in an iframe whose sandbox always granted `allow-same-origin` alongside `allow-scripts`, and the file is served from a path on the application&#39;s own origin, so the sandbox provided no isolation at all. Script in a previewed file could read the victim&#39;s session token and take over the account.</p> <p>## Preconditions - At least one terminal server configured by an admin (`TERMINAL_SERVER_CONNECTIONS`, empty by default) and reachable by the victim. Deployments with no terminal server configured are not affected. - The attacker needs a normal authenticated account with access to that terminal server, no admin rights. - No victim interaction beyond having the chat open: a `display_file` tool call opens the preview automatically. - `TERMINAL_PROXY_HEADERS` unset, which is the default. An operator who had already set a restrictive Content-Security-Policy through it was not exposed, since those headers are merged into every proxied response including the served file. - The `iframeSandboxAllowSameOrigin` user setting is off by default, but the affected branch ignored it entirely.</p> <p>## Impact The previewed document runs in the application origin, so it can reach the parent window, read the session token out of `localStorage` and exfiltrate it, which is full account takeover of the victim. If the vic…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3641