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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-348614</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348614</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-348614</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348614</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-70479</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70479</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 until 0.11.0, with WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright, the Playwright web loader validates only the top-level page request and lets sub-resource requests pass unvalidated. A page supplied by an authenticated user can use JavaScript to reach blocked internal addresses, and returned DOM can include data read from those addresses in web-search or RAG output. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 until 0.11.0, with WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright, the Playwright web loader validates only the top-level page request and lets sub-resource requests pass unvalidated. A page supplied by an authenticated user can use JavaScript to reach blocked internal addresses, and returned DOM can include data read from those addresses in web-search or RAG output. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70479</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w2rx-84hp-gg95 — Open WebUI: SSRF into internal services via unvalidated sub-resource requests in the Playwright web loader</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w2rx-84hp-gg95</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
With the Playwright web loader enabled, Open WebUI opens user-submitted URLs in a real browser and validates the destination address before allowing the request. That check only ran for the top-level page request. Every other request the page issued was passed through unvalidated, so a page could use its own JavaScript to reach addresses the validation exists to block. Because the loader returns the page&amp;#39;s final DOM to the requesting user, anything the page read back from those addresses ends up in the web-search or RAG output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- `WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright`. This is not the default; deployments on the default web loader are unaffected.
- A reachable Playwright browser, either local or via `PLAYWRIGHT_WS_URL`.
- Any authenticated user who can submit a URL for ingestion or trigger a web search. No administrator role is required.
- Something worth reading on a network the browser can reach. A deployment whose browser container has no route to internal services loses nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An authenticated user can read HTTP responses from services reachable by the browser process: cloud instance metadata, other containers on the same network, and internal APIs bound to private addresses. The content is returned to the user through the normal web-search or document-ingestion result, so this is a read primitive, not a blind one. It confers no write access and no availability impact, and it does not extend beyond what the browser&amp;#39;s network positio…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
With the Playwright web loader enabled, Open WebUI opens user-submitted URLs in a real browser and validates the destination address before allowing the request. That check only ran for the top-level page request. Every other request the page issued was passed through unvalidated, so a page could use its own JavaScript to reach addresses the validation exists to block. Because the loader returns the page&amp;#39;s final DOM to the requesting user, anything the page read back from those addresses ends up in the web-search or RAG output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- `WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright`. This is not the default; deployments on the default web loader are unaffected.
- A reachable Playwright browser, either local or via `PLAYWRIGHT_WS_URL`.
- Any authenticated user who can submit a URL for ingestion or trigger a web search. No administrator role is required.
- Something worth reading on a network the browser can reach. A deployment whose browser container has no route to internal services loses nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An authenticated user can read HTTP responses from services reachable by the browser process: cloud instance metadata, other containers on the same network, and internal APIs bound to private addresses. The content is returned to the user through the normal web-search or document-ingestion result, so this is a read primitive, not a blind one. It confers no write access and no availability impact, and it does not extend beyond what the browser&amp;#39;s network positio…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w2rx-84hp-gg95</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3653 — Open WebUI: SSRF into internal services via unvalidated sub-resource requests in the Playwright web loader</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3653</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
With the Playwright web loader enabled, Open WebUI opens user-submitted URLs in a real browser and validates the destination address before allowing the request. That check only ran for the top-level page request. Every other request the page issued was passed through unvalidated, so a page could use its own JavaScript to reach addresses the validation exists to block. Because the loader returns the page&amp;#39;s final DOM to the requesting user, anything the page read back from those addresses ends up in the web-search or RAG output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- `WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright`. This is not the default; deployments on the default web loader are unaffected.
- A reachable Playwright browser, either local or via `PLAYWRIGHT_WS_URL`.
- Any authenticated user who can submit a URL for ingestion or trigger a web search. No administrator role is required.
- Something worth reading on a network the browser can reach. A deployment whose browser container has no route to internal services loses nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An authenticated user can read HTTP responses from services reachable by the browser process: cloud instance metadata, other containers on the same network, and internal APIs bound to private addresses. The content is returned to the user through the normal web-search or document-ingestion result, so this is a read primitive, not a blind one. It confers no write access and no availability impact, and it does not extend beyond what the browser&amp;#39;s network positio…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
With the Playwright web loader enabled, Open WebUI opens user-submitted URLs in a real browser and validates the destination address before allowing the request. That check only ran for the top-level page request. Every other request the page issued was passed through unvalidated, so a page could use its own JavaScript to reach addresses the validation exists to block. Because the loader returns the page&amp;#39;s final DOM to the requesting user, anything the page read back from those addresses ends up in the web-search or RAG output.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions
- `WEB_LOADER_ENGINE=playwright`. This is not the default; deployments on the default web loader are unaffected.
- A reachable Playwright browser, either local or via `PLAYWRIGHT_WS_URL`.
- Any authenticated user who can submit a URL for ingestion or trigger a web search. No administrator role is required.
- Something worth reading on a network the browser can reach. A deployment whose browser container has no route to internal services loses nothing here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
An authenticated user can read HTTP responses from services reachable by the browser process: cloud instance metadata, other containers on the same network, and internal APIs bound to private addresses. The content is returned to the user through the normal web-search or document-ingestion result, so this is a read primitive, not a blind one. It confers no write access and no availability impact, and it does not extend beyond what the browser&amp;#39;s network positio…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3653</guid>
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