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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407087</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407087</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407087</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407087</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jq3q-62jc-fqq9 — code-review-mcp-server: Command injection via unsanitized folderPath/baseBranch parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jq3q-62jc-fqq9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: code-review-mcp-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`code-review-mcp-server` exposes MCP tools (`getLocalGitDiff`, `codeReview`, `createPR`, `getPRTemplate`) that accept `folderPath` and `baseBranch` string parameters. These caller-controlled values were interpolated directly into shell command strings executed via `child_process.execSync()`, which runs commands through `/bin/sh`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted value such as `baseBranch = &amp;#34;main; &amp;lt;arbitrary command&amp;gt; #&amp;#34;` (or a `$(...)` command substitution, or a `folderPath` that breaks out of the surrounding quotes) results in **arbitrary command execution** on the host running the MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **1.5.3**. Every `execSync()` call was replaced with `execFileSync()` using argument arrays, so inputs are passed directly to `git` / `gh` without going through a shell, eliminating the injection at its root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None. Upgrade to `code-review-mcp-server@1.5.3` or later.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: code-review-mcp-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`code-review-mcp-server` exposes MCP tools (`getLocalGitDiff`, `codeReview`, `createPR`, `getPRTemplate`) that accept `folderPath` and `baseBranch` string parameters. These caller-controlled values were interpolated directly into shell command strings executed via `child_process.execSync()`, which runs commands through `/bin/sh`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted value such as `baseBranch = &amp;#34;main; &amp;lt;arbitrary command&amp;gt; #&amp;#34;` (or a `$(...)` command substitution, or a `folderPath` that breaks out of the surrounding quotes) results in **arbitrary command execution** on the host running the MCP server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **1.5.3**. Every `execSync()` call was replaced with `execFileSync()` using argument arrays, so inputs are passed directly to `git` / `gh` without going through a shell, eliminating the injection at its root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None. Upgrade to `code-review-mcp-server@1.5.3` or later.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jq3q-62jc-fqq9</guid>
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