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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:47:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-68160</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68160</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1069 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1069</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-356076</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356076</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-356076</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356076</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-68160</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromise…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromise…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68160</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-prf2-r76g-87fc</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-prf2-r76g-87fc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromise…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromise…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-prf2-r76g-87fc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-68160 — ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-68160</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-68160</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3531 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3531</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() /…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;amp;gt;snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &amp;amp;amp;realm)) { ... }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg-&amp;amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_snaps /
ri-&amp;amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eleven msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() /…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3531</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68160</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:     snaptrace     = h + 1;     snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);     p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;     ...     case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:         if (snaptrace_len) {             ...             if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,                                        snaptrace + snaptrace_len,                                        false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps / ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:     snaptrace     = h + 1;     snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h-&amp;gt;snap_trace_len);     p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;     ...     case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:         if (snaptrace_len) {             ...             if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,                                        snaptrace + snaptrace_len,                                        false, &amp;amp;realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&amp;amp;p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg-&amp;gt;front buffer, and ri-&amp;gt;num_snaps / ri-&amp;gt;num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version &amp;gt;= 2 .. msg_version &amp;gt;= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68160</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2730 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2730</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2730</guid>
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