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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 21:55:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-68147</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68147</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-68147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1069 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1069</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1069</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-356029</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356029</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-356029</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356029</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-68147</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68147</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
  site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It
  just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
  blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block
devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
  site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It
  just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
  blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block
devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m9pv-2424-h7vv</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m9pv-2424-h7vv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
  site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It
  just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
  blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block
devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
  site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It
  just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
  blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block
devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m9pv-2424-h7vv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-68147 — fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-68147</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-68147</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-68147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-68147</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68147</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call   site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It   just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling   blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free. For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem&amp;#39;s list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array.  This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call   site when it&amp;#39;s invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn&amp;#39;t handle the failure.  It   just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling   blk_crypto_evict_key().  That causes a use-after-free. For now, let&amp;#39;s fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array.  Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices.  An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won&amp;#39;t scale up to large number of block devices.  For that we&amp;#39;d need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem.  Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won&amp;#39;t be needed.)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-68147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2730 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2730</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise die Ausführung von beliebigem Code, die Ausweitung von Berechtigungen, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Manipulation von Daten oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2730</guid>
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