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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-343839</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343839</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-343839</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343839</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-67354</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67354</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67354</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h95v-h523-3mw8 — Guzzle: URI fragments disclosed in redirect Referer headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h95v-h523-3mw8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: guzzlehttp/guzzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the optional `referer` redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of `RedirectMiddleware` can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated `Referer` header. A URI fragment is the part after `#`. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated `Referer` tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in `#secret` is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a `Referer` ending in `#secret`. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable `allow_redirects.referer`, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `referer` setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: guzzlehttp/guzzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the optional `referer` redirect setting is enabled, affected versions of `RedirectMiddleware` can copy the fragment from the referring request URI into a generated `Referer` header. A URI fragment is the part after `#`. It is handled locally by the client and is not part of the HTTP request target, so the server handling the original request does not receive it. A generated `Referer` tells the redirect destination which URI led to the request. Guzzle correctly removes user information from that value, but retains the fragment when it follows a redirect to the same scheme, such as HTTPS to HTTPS. For example, an initial URI ending in `#secret` is sent without the fragment, but the redirect destination can receive a `Referer` ending in `#secret`. This behavior affects both the cURL and stream handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read the fragment from the incoming header, including through request logs or application code. If the fragment contains a one-time login secret, access token, state value, or other private client data, it is disclosed to a server that was never meant to receive it. Exploitation requires the application to enable `allow_redirects.referer`, make a request to a URI with a sensitive fragment, and follow a same-scheme redirect to a less-trusted destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `referer` setting is disabled by default. Applications that leave it disabled, do not put sensitive data in URI fragments, do not follow redirects, or o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h95v-h523-3mw8</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-67354</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67354</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: guzzle, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: guzzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: guzzle, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: guzzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67354</guid>
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