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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:31:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-10999</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10999</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-10999</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10999</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-aider-CVE-2026-67323 — GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overw…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-67323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-67323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-352667</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352667</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-352667</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352667</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-67323</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v — GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overw…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-956x-8gvw-wg5v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-956x-8gvw-wg5v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-3249 — python-GitPython security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&amp;amp;apos;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.(CVE-2026-67322)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;amp;lt;path&amp;amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.(CVE-2026-67323)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython 3.1.50 fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u&amp;amp;lt;value&amp;amp;gt; (the short form of --upload-pack=&amp;amp;lt;value&amp;amp;gt;) when enforcing i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&amp;amp;apos;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.(CVE-2026-67322)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;amp;lt;path&amp;amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.(CVE-2026-67323)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython 3.1.50 fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u&amp;amp;lt;value&amp;amp;gt; (the short form of --upload-pack=&amp;amp;lt;value&amp;amp;gt;) when enforcing i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21874-1 — Security update for python-GitPython</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21874-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for python-GitPython&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for python-GitPython&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21874-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3839 — GitPython: command injection via unguarded Git options in `Repo.archive()`, `git.ls_remote()`, and arbitrary file overw…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3839</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython already know that --upload-pack / --exec are command-exec vectors, they are denylist in
git/remote.py:535 and check by Git.check_unsafe_options() (git/cmd.py:963), the thing is this
check him he is only call from fetch, pull, push and clone_from, everything else who build a git
argv from caller values just go through, no check, three examples&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Code analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.archive (git/repo/base.py:1623) do self.git.archive(&amp;#34;--&amp;#34;, treeish, *path, **kwargs), the
treeish is after the --, but the kwargs get dashify by transform_kwarg (git/cmd.py:1487) and
they land before it, so {&amp;#34;remote&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;exec&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;} give
git archive --remote=. --exec=&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt; -- &amp;lt;rev&amp;gt;, the --remote spawn the upload-archive helper and
--exec choose which binary that is, done, default git config, no protocol.ext.allow needed, and
archive already document caller kwargs (format, prefix, path) so pass a dict is normal usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;repo.git.ls_remote(url, upload_pack=&amp;#34;&amp;lt;cmd&amp;gt;&amp;#34;), same builder, same result, it&amp;#39;s exactly the kwarg
gap that CVE-2026-42215 close for fetch/pull/push/clone_from, except the dynamic
repo.git.&amp;lt;anything&amp;gt;(**user_dict) surface him he never got the fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Repo.iter_commits / Repo.blame (git/objects/commit.py:348, git/repo/base.py:1199) put the rev
before the --, no leading-dash check, a &amp;#34;branch name&amp;#34; like --output=/etc/whatever become
git rev-list --output=... --, and git he open and truncate that file before he even validate the
revision, the file is gone even if the command error ri…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3839</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:44416 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:44416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;gitpython: GitPython: Environment variable exfiltration via attacker-controlled clone URL gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unguarded Git options gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via Git option prefix abbreviation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via Newline Injection in config_writer()&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;gitpython: GitPython: Environment variable exfiltration via attacker-controlled clone URL gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unguarded Git options gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via Git option prefix abbreviation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via Newline Injection in config_writer()&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:44416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-67323</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67323</guid>
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