https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:52:59 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10998 bdu:2026-10998 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-10998 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-67322 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aider</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-67322 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352666 EUVD-2026-352666 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352666 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67322 <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67322 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rwj8-pgh3-r573 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: GitPython</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rwj8-pgh3-r573 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3249 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&amp;apos;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.(CVE-2026-67322)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.(CVE-2026-67323)</p> <p>GitPython 3.1.50 fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u&amp;lt;value&amp;gt; (the short form of --upload-pack=&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;) when enforcing i…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-GitPython</p> <p>GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&amp;apos;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.(CVE-2026-67322)</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.51 fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and git.ls_remote(), allowing command injection via options such as --exec/--upload-pack (leading to arbitrary command execution). Additionally, Repo.iter_commits() and Repo.blame() do not check for leading-dash revision arguments, so a revision like --output=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt; can cause Git to open and truncate an arbitrary file. Exploitation requires an application that passes attacker-controlled arguments to these methods.(CVE-2026-67323)</p> <p>GitPython 3.1.50 fails to recognize joined short-option forms such as -u&amp;lt;value&amp;gt; (the short form of --upload-pack=&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;) when enforcing i…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3249 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11466-1 <p>python313-GitPython-3.1.58-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>python313-GitPython-3.1.58-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11466-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3842 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: gitpython</p> <p>### Summary `Repo.clone_from()` passes the caller-supplied remote URL through `Git.polish_url()`, which on every non-Cygwin platform calls `os.path.expandvars()` on the URL before handing it to `git clone`. An attacker who controls the URL argument — the documented use case for `clone_from()` in &#34;import repository from URL&#34; features of CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — can embed `$NAME` / `${NAME}` tokens that are expanded server-side to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables. The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to the attacker-named host. This crosses the trust boundary between an untrusted remote URL and the server&#39;s process environment, disclosing secrets such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` with no precondition beyond the ability to submit a clone URL.</p> <p>### Details **Affected versions:** `gitpython` (PyPI) — all releases up to and including `3.1.50` (latest at time of reporting); confirmed present on the `main` branch.</p> <p>`Git.polish_url()` unconditionally applies environment-variable expansion to its input on the non-Cygwin branch:</p> <p>`git/cmd.py` (v3.1.50), lines 907–925: ```python @classmethod def polish_url(cls, url: str, is_cygwin: Union[None, bool] = None) -&gt; PathLike: &#34;&#34;&#34;Remove any backslashes from URLs to be written in config files. ... &#34;&#34;&#34; if is_cygwin is None: is_cygwin = cls.is_cygwin()</p> <p>if is_cygwin: url = cygpath(url) else:…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3842 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:44416 <p>gitpython: GitPython: Environment variable exfiltration via attacker-controlled clone URL gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unguarded Git options gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via Git option prefix abbreviation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via Newline Injection in config_writer()</p> <p>gitpython: GitPython: Environment variable exfiltration via attacker-controlled clone URL gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unguarded Git options gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via Git option prefix abbreviation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via Newline Injection in config_writer()</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:44416 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67322 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git</p> <p>GitPython before 3.1.52 is vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from(). The caller-supplied remote URL is passed through Git.polish_url(), which on non-Cygwin platforms calls os.path.expandvars() on the URL before invoking git clone. An attacker who controls the clone URL can embed $NAME or ${NAME} tokens that are expanded to the values of the hosting process&#39;s environment variables (e.g., AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or GITHUB_TOKEN). The resulting URL, now containing the secret, is transmitted over the network to an attacker-controlled host during the clone attempt, disclosing the secret.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-67322