https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 06:13:57 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349496 EUVD-2026-349496 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349496 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64655 <p>GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  `.`  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  `.`  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.</p> <p>GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  `.`  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  `.`  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64655 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64655 msrc_CVE-2026-64655 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64655 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11530-1 <p>gh-2.97.0-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>gh-2.97.0-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11530-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64655 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: gh, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: gh, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gh</p> <p>GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  `.`  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  `.`  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: gh, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: gh, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gh</p> <p>GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  `.`  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  `.`  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64655