https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:40:05 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64586 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090 certfr-2026-avi-1090 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1090 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357828 EUVD-2026-357828 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357828 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64586 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal</p> <p>brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr.</p> <p>Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock.</p> <p>Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregist…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal</p> <p>brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr.</p> <p>Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock.</p> <p>Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregist…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5rg4-8h2h-x94w <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal</p> <p>brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr.</p> <p>Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock.</p> <p>Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregist…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal</p> <p>brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr.</p> <p>Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock.</p> <p>Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregist…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5rg4-8h2h-x94w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64586 msrc_CVE-2026-64586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64586 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister t…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs &#34;reset&#34; entry both schedule drvr-&gt;bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -&gt; wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -&gt; brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -&gt; brcmf_sdiod_remove -&gt; brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister t…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64586 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2680 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise das Auslösen eines Denial-of-Service-Zustands, die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen oder das Verursachen von Speicherbeschädigungen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, darunter möglicherweise das Auslösen eines Denial-of-Service-Zustands, die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen oder das Verursachen von Speicherbeschädigungen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2680