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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 06:18:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1030 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1030</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1030</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1030</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-355982</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355982</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-355982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-834p-x3hc-j46g</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-834p-x3hc-j46g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes
num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk
btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key
with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is
validated before the load trusts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current
one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which
does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in
io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);
	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index
runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because
io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once
io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries
in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes
the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and
pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read
65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-834p-x3hc-j46g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64567 — btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64567</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64567</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is validated before the load trusts it. The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries: 	num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); 	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS); So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same check. To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read 65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is validated before the load trusts it. The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -&amp;gt; io_ctl_map_page(), which does io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages[io_ctl-&amp;gt;index++]. But pages[] is allocated in io_ctl_init() from the cache inode&amp;#39;s i_size, not from num_entries: 	num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); 	io_ctl-&amp;gt;pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS); So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once io_ctl-&amp;gt;index &amp;gt;= io_ctl-&amp;gt;num_pages; the read side just never had the same check. To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = &amp;lt;N&amp;gt; here), set num_entries in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read 65536 entries, io_ctl-&amp;gt;index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2659 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2659</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um den Speicher zu beschädigen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um den Speicher zu beschädigen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2659</guid>
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