<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:45:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0954 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0954</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0954</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-341136</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341136</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-341136</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341136</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-86px-9vhr-gg2j</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-86px-9vhr-gg2j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-86px-9vhr-gg2j</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21910-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 192 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 192 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
