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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:38:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64504</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64504</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64504</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-353403</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353403</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-353403</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353403</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64504</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64504</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples)
		count = samples;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples)
		count = samples;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64504</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4j8x-6qx9-p4gc</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4j8x-6qx9-p4gc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples)
		count = samples;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples)
		count = samples;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4j8x-6qx9-p4gc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64504 — iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64504</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64504</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64504</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64504</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64504</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count __bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer 	u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3]; which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its 7 valid bits: 	count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F; so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional caller-supplied sample budget: 	if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples) 		count = samples; which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are then transferred into buffer[]: 	bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count); bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[] is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate d…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count __bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer 	u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3]; which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its 7 valid bits: 	count = val &amp;amp; 0x7F; so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional caller-supplied sample budget: 	if (samples &amp;amp;&amp;amp; count &amp;gt; samples) 		count = samples; which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are then transferred into buffer[]: 	bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count); bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[] is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate d…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64504</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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