https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:34:44 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64293 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64293 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162 certfr-2026-avi-1162 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353207 EUVD-2026-353207 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353207 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64293 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read</p> <p>The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):</p> <p>if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) {</p> <p>hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently:</p> <p>if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr);</p> <p>struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.</p> <p>On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.</p> <p>It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.</p> <p>Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read</p> <p>The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):</p> <p>if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) {</p> <p>hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently:</p> <p>if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr);</p> <p>struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.</p> <p>On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.</p> <p>It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.</p> <p>Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64293 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rq5j-2985-g74r <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read</p> <p>The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):</p> <p>if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) {</p> <p>hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently:</p> <p>if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr);</p> <p>struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.</p> <p>On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.</p> <p>It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.</p> <p>Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read</p> <p>The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):</p> <p>if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) {</p> <p>hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently:</p> <p>if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr);</p> <p>struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.</p> <p>On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.</p> <p>It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.</p> <p>Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rq5j-2985-g74r https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64293 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr): if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) { hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently: if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr); struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended. On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer. It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width. Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr): if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &amp;&amp; sizeof(hdr) + cur-&gt;data_len &gt; count - done) { hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently: if (done &gt;= count || sizeof(*hdr) &gt; count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr); struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended. On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-&gt;data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur-&gt;data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer. It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width. Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64293 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527