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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 06:41:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-fpdns-CVE-2026-64194 — Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-fpdns-cve-2026-64194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: fpdns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: fpdns&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-fpdns-cve-2026-64194</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-361701</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361701</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-361701</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361701</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64194</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64194</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m3gj-74x3-vc94</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m3gj-74x3-vc94</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m3gj-74x3-vc94</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11396-1 — perl-Net-DNS-1.560.0-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11396-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;perl-Net-DNS-1.560.0-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;perl-Net-DNS-1.560.0-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11396-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:3431-1 — Security update for perl-Net-DNS</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:3431-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for perl-Net-DNS&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for perl-Net-DNS&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:3431-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64194</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains. Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service. The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth. A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data. The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: libnet-dns-perl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Net::DNS versions through 1.55 for Perl allow Denial of Service via deep DNS compression pointer chains. Net::DNS::DomainName::decode follows RFC 1035 compression pointers by recursing into itself with no depth limit. It is possible to construct a name which saturates the call stack (at least with larger TCP responses), leading to a potential Denial of Service. The guard `$link &amp;lt; $offset` prevents forward and circular chains, but still allows arbitrarily long backward chains. The per-offset cache (`$cache`) is populated at the start of each call and short-circuits only re-traverses of the same offset - the initial descent through a fresh chain still recurses at full depth. A crafted packet can chain two-byte compression pointers so that each one points two bytes earlier than the previous, producing a chain length of `offset / 2`. For the 14-bit pointer field (max offset 16383) this gives up to ~8191 recursive frames. For a TCP DNS message the limit is the 16-bit length field (~32767 frames). Perl&amp;#39;s default C stack handles only a few thousand frames; beyond that the process receives SIGSEGV or similar, which is a denial-of-service for any application parsing untrusted DNS data. The vulnerability is triggered by `Net::DNS::Packet-&amp;gt;new(\$wire)` i.e. any point where the library decodes a DNS message from the network.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64194</guid>
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