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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:49:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64130</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64130</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64130</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338764</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338764</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338764</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338764</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64130</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64130</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this
flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during
__free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will
consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing
tag memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that
will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and
friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet
(PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD
marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up
exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state
that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user
space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to
tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have
clearer semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced with the hug…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this
flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during
__free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will
consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing
tag memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that
will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and
friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet
(PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD
marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up
exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state
that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user
space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to
tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have
clearer semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced with the hug…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64130</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jjh5-mvrv-5xmg</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jjh5-mvrv-5xmg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this
flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during
__free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will
consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing
tag memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that
will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and
friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet
(PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD
marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up
exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state
that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user
space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to
tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have
clearer semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced with the hug…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this
flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during
__free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will
consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing
tag memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that
will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and
friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet
(PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD
marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up
exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state
that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user
space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to
tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have
clearer semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced with the hug…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jjh5-mvrv-5xmg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64130</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64130</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 111 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free __GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN. If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path. However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory. Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them. However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages. The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is enabled. Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content. Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have clearer semantics. Reproduced with the huge zero fol…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 111 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free __GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN. If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path. However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory. Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them. However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages. The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user space.  That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is enabled. Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content. Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have clearer semantics. Reproduced with the huge zero fol…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64130</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
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