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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-320185</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-320185</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-320185</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-320185</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-6406</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6406</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6406</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3f9v-226v-2qc9</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3f9v-226v-2qc9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3f9v-226v-2qc9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1259 — Docker Desktop: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Privilegieneskalation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Docker Desktop ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Docker Desktop ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1259</guid>
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