<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 21:13:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-14305</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14305</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-14305</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-14305</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64014</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64014</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64014</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338725</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338725</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338725</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338725</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64014</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64014</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len)
and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()
callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len)
and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()
callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64014</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xrpw-4crp-8hgj</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xrpw-4crp-8hgj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len)
and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()
callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len)
and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()
callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xrpw-4crp-8hgj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21910-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21910-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64014</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64014</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len) and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data() callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device&amp;#39;s interrupt packet and then walks packet-&amp;gt;data[0..x_len) and packet-&amp;gt;data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold. Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet-&amp;gt;data[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data() callbacks are not given urb-&amp;gt;actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk. A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault. Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer&amp;#39;s data[] capacity and x_len to data_len.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64014</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
