<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 21:02:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-63950</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63950</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63950</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-348320</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348320</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-348320</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348320</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63950</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63950</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like
folio_referenced_one() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call
can be reused on a later iteration that does not run
folio_unmap_pte_batch() again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call
madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via
HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will
first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. 
This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets
reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio
refcount/mapcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit
out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there
are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap
(which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid
going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at
folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree
folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to
refcount/m…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like
folio_referenced_one() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call
can be reused on a later iteration that does not run
folio_unmap_pte_batch() again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call
madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via
HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will
first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. 
This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets
reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio
refcount/mapcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit
out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there
are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap
(which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid
going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at
folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree
folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to
refcount/m…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63950</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9fqf-4mvh-6fx9</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9fqf-4mvh-6fx9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like
folio_referenced_one() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call
can be reused on a later iteration that does not run
folio_unmap_pte_batch() again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call
madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via
HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will
first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. 
This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets
reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio
refcount/mapcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit
out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there
are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap
(which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid
going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at
folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree
folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to
refcount/m…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like
folio_referenced_one() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call
can be reused on a later iteration that does not run
folio_unmap_pte_batch() again.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call
madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via
HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will
first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. 
This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets
reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio
refcount/mapcount.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit
out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there
are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap
(which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid
going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at
folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree
folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to
refcount/m…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9fqf-4mvh-6fx9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63950</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63950</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like folio_referenced_one() does. Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call can be reused on a later iteration that does not run folio_unmap_pte_batch() again. mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE. Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio refcount/mapcount. At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap (which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted. Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios. Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to refcount/mapcount c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like folio_referenced_one() does. Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call can be reused on a later iteration that does not run folio_unmap_pte_batch() again. mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE. Trigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. This will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio refcount/mapcount. At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap (which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted. Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios. Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to refcount/mapcount c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63950</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
