https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 02:32:39 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63939 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63939 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926 certfr-2026-avi-0926 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348312 EUVD-2026-348312 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348312 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63939 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area</p> <p>When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.</p> <p>The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).</p> <p>Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area</p> <p>When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.</p> <p>The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).</p> <p>Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63939 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-94xr-m4g8-q6cc <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area</p> <p>When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.</p> <p>The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).</p> <p>Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area</p> <p>When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.</p> <p>The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).</p> <p>Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-94xr-m4g8-q6cc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63939 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 118 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was &#34;fine&#34; when first introduced, as KVM doesn&#39;t consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63939 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403