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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 13:26:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-63895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0926 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0926</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338678</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338678</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338678</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338678</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
    if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
            ret = -EFAULT;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT
    (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
  * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.
  * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the
    request.
  * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before
copy_to_user().  This pat…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
    if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
            ret = -EFAULT;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT
    (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
  * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.
  * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the
    request.
  * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before
copy_to_user().  This pat…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hqp4-gw43-6pcc</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hqp4-gw43-6pcc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
    if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
            ret = -EFAULT;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT
    (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
  * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.
  * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the
    request.
  * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before
copy_to_user().  This pat…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
    if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
            ret = -EFAULT;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT
    (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
  * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.
  * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the
    request.
  * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before
copy_to_user().  This pat…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hqp4-gw43-6pcc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:21555-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21555-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23066-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23066-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63895</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received:     data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);     ...     ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);     if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))             ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:   * dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT     (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).   * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.   * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the     request.   * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before copy_to_user().  This patch brin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received:     data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);     ...     ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);     if ((ret &amp;gt; 0) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))             ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-&amp;gt;actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len.  The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:   * dwc2 continues on req-&amp;gt;actual &amp;lt; req-&amp;gt;length for ep0 DATA OUT     (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).   * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len &amp;lt; ep-&amp;gt;ep.maxpacket.   * renesas_usbf logs &amp;#34;ep0 short packet&amp;#34; and completes the     request.   * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with.  The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev-&amp;gt;req-&amp;gt;actual) before copy_to_user().  This patch brin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63895</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
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