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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:21:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-63811</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-63811</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1162 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1162</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-353132</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353132</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-353132</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-353132</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63811</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode,
			      ...);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not
the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the u…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode,
			      ...);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not
the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the u…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63811</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wqxg-ff3c-39jf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wqxg-ff3c-39jf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode,
			      ...);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not
the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the u…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode,
			      ...);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not
the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the u…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wqxg-ff3c-39jf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-63811 — f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-63811</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-63811</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-63811</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11339-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.4-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11339-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.4-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.4-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11339-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63811</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: 	f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode, 			      ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencry…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 154 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: 	f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-&amp;gt;cow_inode : inode, 			      ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode&amp;#39;s context, not the COW inode&amp;#39;s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio-&amp;gt;page-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio-&amp;gt;mapping-&amp;gt;host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencry…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63811</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2403 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2403</guid>
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