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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-402597</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402597</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-402597</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402597</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63634</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63634</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;pympp is a Python SDK for the Machine Payments Protocol. Prior to version 0.9.1, when the server acts as the fee_payer, pympp validates calldata using eth_abi decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The FeePayerPolicy caps gas_limit (≤ 2 M) and max_fee_per_gas (≤ 100 Gwei) but does not check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: 16 gas per non-zero byte. Appending N bytes of 0x01 padding inflates actual gas used by N × 16 while keeping gas_limit and max_fee_per_gas within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;pympp is a Python SDK for the Machine Payments Protocol. Prior to version 0.9.1, when the server acts as the fee_payer, pympp validates calldata using eth_abi decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The FeePayerPolicy caps gas_limit (≤ 2 M) and max_fee_per_gas (≤ 100 Gwei) but does not check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: 16 gas per non-zero byte. Appending N bytes of 0x01 padding inflates actual gas used by N × 16 while keeping gas_limit and max_fee_per_gas within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63634</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v858-xh7w-8jr5 — pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v858-xh7w-8jr5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pympp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:
```bash
unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip
cd pympp_python
docker build -t pympp-padding .
docker run --rm pympp-padding
``` 
There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal tran…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pympp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:
```bash
unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip
cd pympp_python
docker build -t pympp-padding .
docker run --rm pympp-padding
``` 
There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal tran…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v858-xh7w-8jr5</guid>
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