<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 14:56:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-398613</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398613</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-398613</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398613</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61725</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61725</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;sevenz-rust2 is a Rust-native 7z compressor and `decompress`or. Prior to 0.21.1, extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write or overwrite files outside the destination directory. In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes each destination with `dest.join(entry.name())` without normalizing the archive&amp;#39;s UTF-16 entry name or verifying containment, and `default_entry_extract_fn` writes to it with `File::create`. Parent-directory components escape the extraction root, and an absolute entry path makes the join discard the destination entirely. The convenience entry points `decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, and `decompress_file_with_password` all use this default path. Overwriting writable configuration, startup, cron, or build files can lead to code execution or persistence. The archive bytes are the attacker-controlled trust boundary, including for applications that automatically unpack uploaded or otherwise untrusted archives. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;sevenz-rust2 is a Rust-native 7z compressor and `decompress`or. Prior to 0.21.1, extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write or overwrite files outside the destination directory. In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes each destination with `dest.join(entry.name())` without normalizing the archive&amp;#39;s UTF-16 entry name or verifying containment, and `default_entry_extract_fn` writes to it with `File::create`. Parent-directory components escape the extraction root, and an absolute entry path makes the join discard the destination entirely. The convenience entry points `decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, and `decompress_file_with_password` all use this default path. Overwriting writable configuration, startup, cron, or build files can lead to code execution or persistence. The archive bytes are the attacker-controlled trust boundary, including for applications that automatically unpack uploaded or otherwise untrusted archives. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61725</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc — sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qh76-45cr-8xrc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: sevenz-rust2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry&amp;#39;s path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named `../../etc/cron.d/x` or an absolute path escapes the target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &amp;amp;dest_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`default_entry_extract_fn` (line 154) then acts on that path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let file = File::create(path)
    .map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no normalization, no `dest_path.starts_with(dest)` check, and no symlink-entry handling. `Path::join` discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and `..` components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (`decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, `decompress_file_with_password`) all route through `decompress_impl` with `default_entry_extract_fn`, so the default API is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted `.7z` reaches the sink.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Build a `.7z` whose `FilesInfo` contains an entry named `../../../../tmp/pwned` (or, on…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: sevenz-rust2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry&amp;#39;s path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named `../../etc/cron.d/x` or an absolute path escapes the target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &amp;amp;dest_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`default_entry_extract_fn` (line 154) then acts on that path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let file = File::create(path)
    .map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no normalization, no `dest_path.starts_with(dest)` check, and no symlink-entry handling. `Path::join` discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and `..` components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (`decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, `decompress_file_with_password`) all route through `decompress_impl` with `default_entry_extract_fn`, so the default API is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted `.7z` reaches the sink.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Build a `.7z` whose `FilesInfo` contains an entry named `../../../../tmp/pwned` (or, on…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qh76-45cr-8xrc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-61725</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-61725</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-sevenz-rust2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sevenz-rust2 is a Rust-native 7z compressor and `decompress`or. Prior to 0.21.1, extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write or overwrite files outside the destination directory. In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes each destination with `dest.join(entry.name())` without normalizing the archive&amp;#39;s UTF-16 entry name or verifying containment, and `default_entry_extract_fn` writes to it with `File::create`. Parent-directory components escape the extraction root, and an absolute entry path makes the join discard the destination entirely. The convenience entry points `decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, and `decompress_file_with_password` all use this default path. Overwriting writable configuration, startup, cron, or build files can lead to code execution or persistence. The archive bytes are the attacker-controlled trust boundary, including for applications that automatically unpack uploaded or otherwise untrusted archives. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-sevenz-rust2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sevenz-rust2 is a Rust-native 7z compressor and `decompress`or. Prior to 0.21.1, extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write or overwrite files outside the destination directory. In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes each destination with `dest.join(entry.name())` without normalizing the archive&amp;#39;s UTF-16 entry name or verifying containment, and `default_entry_extract_fn` writes to it with `File::create`. Parent-directory components escape the extraction root, and an absolute entry path makes the join discard the destination entirely. The convenience entry points `decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, and `decompress_file_with_password` all use this default path. Overwriting writable configuration, startup, cron, or build files can lead to code execution or persistence. The archive bytes are the attacker-controlled trust boundary, including for applications that automatically unpack uploaded or otherwise untrusted archives. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-61725</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
