<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:35:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-370609</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370609</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-370609</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370609</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61597</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61597</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but never validating the URL scheme. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click. Version 1.0.7 contains a fix. As a workaround, do not pass user-controllable URLs to the affected built-in component tags; pre-validate URL schemes in application code before binding them to component arguments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but never validating the URL scheme. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click. Version 1.0.7 contains a fix. As a workaround, do not pass user-controllable URLs to the affected built-in component tags; pre-validate URL schemes in application code before binding them to component arguments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61597</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4mf4-73j6-mvrw — djust is vulnerable to stored/reflected XSS via javascript: URLs in built-in component template tags</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4mf4-73j6-mvrw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but **never validating the URL scheme**. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected sinks (executing href/action contexts; not exhaustive): breadcrumb (`djust_components.py:1535`; `_advanced.py:1999,2022`), `dj_nav` link/dropdown/brand (`djust_components.py:5632,5779,5807,5830`), citation URL (`:6936`), cookie-consent privacy link (`:8240`), error-page action (`_advanced.py:1728`), form `action` (`_forms.py:1239`). `&amp;lt;img src&amp;gt;` sinks are lower risk (javascript: does not execute via img src). No scheme validation exists anywhere in the component tags; a docstring at `djust_components.py:781` even acknowledges the `javascript:` risk without mitigating it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity Medium:** XSS in the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session whenever an app renders one of these components with a URL sourced from user-controllable data; for `href` requires a click, worst case is the stored variant (URL persisted from one user, rendered to another). Conditional on developer usage, hence Medium rather than High.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced: `breadcrumb(items=[{&amp;#34;l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but **never validating the URL scheme**. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected sinks (executing href/action contexts; not exhaustive): breadcrumb (`djust_components.py:1535`; `_advanced.py:1999,2022`), `dj_nav` link/dropdown/brand (`djust_components.py:5632,5779,5807,5830`), citation URL (`:6936`), cookie-consent privacy link (`:8240`), error-page action (`_advanced.py:1728`), form `action` (`_forms.py:1239`). `&amp;lt;img src&amp;gt;` sinks are lower risk (javascript: does not execute via img src). No scheme validation exists anywhere in the component tags; a docstring at `djust_components.py:781` even acknowledges the `javascript:` risk without mitigating it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity Medium:** XSS in the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session whenever an app renders one of these components with a URL sourced from user-controllable data; for `href` requires a click, worst case is the stored variant (URL persisted from one user, rendered to another). Conditional on developer usage, hence Medium rather than High.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced: `breadcrumb(items=[{&amp;#34;l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4mf4-73j6-mvrw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4037 — djust is vulnerable to stored/reflected XSS via javascript: URLs in built-in component template tags</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4037</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but **never validating the URL scheme**. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected sinks (executing href/action contexts; not exhaustive): breadcrumb (`djust_components.py:1535`; `_advanced.py:1999,2022`), `dj_nav` link/dropdown/brand (`djust_components.py:5632,5779,5807,5830`), citation URL (`:6936`), cookie-consent privacy link (`:8240`), error-page action (`_advanced.py:1728`), form `action` (`_forms.py:1239`). `&amp;lt;img src&amp;gt;` sinks are lower risk (javascript: does not execute via img src). No scheme validation exists anywhere in the component tags; a docstring at `djust_components.py:781` even acknowledges the `javascript:` risk without mitigating it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity Medium:** XSS in the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session whenever an app renders one of these components with a URL sourced from user-controllable data; for `href` requires a click, worst case is the stored variant (URL persisted from one user, rendered to another). Conditional on developer usage, hence Medium rather than High.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced: `breadcrumb(items=[{&amp;#34;l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but **never validating the URL scheme**. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.cookie)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and executes in the victim&amp;#39;s session on click.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected sinks (executing href/action contexts; not exhaustive): breadcrumb (`djust_components.py:1535`; `_advanced.py:1999,2022`), `dj_nav` link/dropdown/brand (`djust_components.py:5632,5779,5807,5830`), citation URL (`:6936`), cookie-consent privacy link (`:8240`), error-page action (`_advanced.py:1728`), form `action` (`_forms.py:1239`). `&amp;lt;img src&amp;gt;` sinks are lower risk (javascript: does not execute via img src). No scheme validation exists anywhere in the component tags; a docstring at `djust_components.py:781` even acknowledges the `javascript:` risk without mitigating it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity Medium:** XSS in the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session whenever an app renders one of these components with a URL sourced from user-controllable data; for `href` requires a click, worst case is the stored variant (URL persisted from one user, rendered to another). Conditional on developer usage, hence Medium rather than High.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced: `breadcrumb(items=[{&amp;#34;l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4037</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
