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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 19:53:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-409011</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409011</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409011</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409011</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-59975</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59975</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SharpIppNext is a .NET Standard library for building Internet Printing Protocol clients and servers. Prior to 4.1.0, server-side SharpIppNext implementations using SharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync or SharpIppServer.ReceiveRawRequestAsync pass incoming data to IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync in SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs, where ReadDocumentStream is enabled by default and the remaining document body is copied with CopyToAsync into a MemoryStream without a size limit. An unauthenticated remote client can send an arbitrarily large IPP document body, exhausting process memory and causing an out-of-memory failure or service termination. Client-only implementations using SharpIppClient are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SharpIppNext is a .NET Standard library for building Internet Printing Protocol clients and servers. Prior to 4.1.0, server-side SharpIppNext implementations using SharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync or SharpIppServer.ReceiveRawRequestAsync pass incoming data to IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync in SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs, where ReadDocumentStream is enabled by default and the remaining document body is copied with CopyToAsync into a MemoryStream without a size limit. An unauthenticated remote client can send an arbitrarily large IPP document body, exhausting process memory and causing an out-of-memory failure or service termination. Client-only implementations using SharpIppClient are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59975</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3h63-w8jq-rrf2 — SharpIppNext: Unbounded IPP Document Stream Buffering Leads to Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3h63-w8jq-rrf2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: SharpIppNext&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SharpIppNext&amp;#39;s `IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync()` unconditionally copies the entire attacker-supplied IPP document payload into an unbounded `MemoryStream` with no size limit. Because this behavior is enabled by default (`ReadDocumentStream = true`) and the official server documentation shows `HttpContext.Request.Body` being passed directly to `ReceiveRequestAsync()` without authentication, an unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust the server process&amp;#39;s memory by sending an arbitrarily large IPP request body, causing an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) condition and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt; This vulnerability only affects server-side implementations (using `SharpIppServer` to parse incoming IPP requests). It does not affect client-side implementations using `SharpIppClient` or client-side request construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable sink is in `SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```csharp
// IppProtocol.cs:39 — enabled by default
public bool ReadDocumentStream { get; set; } = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// IppProtocol.cs:466–470 — no size cap on the copy
if (ReadDocumentStream)
{
    message.Document = new MemoryStream();
    await reader.BaseStream.CopyToAsync(message.Document);  // unbounded
    message.Document.Seek(0, SeekOrigin.Begin);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The full call chain from the public API to the vulnerable sink:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `docs/Content/Server/index.md:6–11` — Official server example passes `context.Request.Body` (unauthenticated) to `sharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync(inputStream)`.
2…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: SharpIppNext&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SharpIppNext&amp;#39;s `IppProtocol.ReadIppRequestAsync()` unconditionally copies the entire attacker-supplied IPP document payload into an unbounded `MemoryStream` with no size limit. Because this behavior is enabled by default (`ReadDocumentStream = true`) and the official server documentation shows `HttpContext.Request.Body` being passed directly to `ReceiveRequestAsync()` without authentication, an unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust the server process&amp;#39;s memory by sending an arbitrarily large IPP request body, causing an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) condition and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt; This vulnerability only affects server-side implementations (using `SharpIppServer` to parse incoming IPP requests). It does not affect client-side implementations using `SharpIppClient` or client-side request construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable sink is in `SharpIpp/Protocol/IppProtocol.cs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```csharp
// IppProtocol.cs:39 — enabled by default
public bool ReadDocumentStream { get; set; } = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// IppProtocol.cs:466–470 — no size cap on the copy
if (ReadDocumentStream)
{
    message.Document = new MemoryStream();
    await reader.BaseStream.CopyToAsync(message.Document);  // unbounded
    message.Document.Seek(0, SeekOrigin.Begin);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The full call chain from the public API to the vulnerable sink:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `docs/Content/Server/index.md:6–11` — Official server example passes `context.Request.Body` (unauthenticated) to `sharpIppServer.ReceiveRequestAsync(inputStream)`.
2…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3h63-w8jq-rrf2</guid>
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