https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:04:41 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ff01212 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: n8n</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the n8n package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: n8n</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the n8n package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ff01212 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335379 EUVD-2026-335379 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335379 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59876 <p>protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. From 8.2.0 until 8.6.5, the protobufjs Text Format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment, allowing a map entry with key __proto__ to change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry in protobufjs/ext/textformat. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.5.</p> <p>protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. From 8.2.0 until 8.6.5, the protobufjs Text Format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment, allowing a map entry with key __proto__ to change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry in protobufjs/ext/textformat. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.5.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59876 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfj6-75fj-8934 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: protobufjs</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The protobuf.js text format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment. A text-format map entry with key `__proto__` could therefore change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry.</p> <p>This affected the optional Text Format extension. Other protobufjs input paths, including binary decode, `fromObject`, and ProtoJSON conversion, are not affected.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An attacker who can provide protobuf text-format input parsed by an application using `protobufjs/ext/textformat` may be able to create message objects whose string-keyed map fields have attacker-controlled prototypes.</p> <p>This is per-object prototype mutation, not global `Object.prototype` pollution. Impact depends on downstream application logic treating inherited properties as meaningful, for example by using `in`, truthiness checks, or direct property access on parsed map objects instead of own-property checks.</p> <p>Applications that do not parse untrusted Text Format input, or that do not use inherited properties from parsed map objects in security-relevant logic, are not directly affected.</p> <p>## Preconditions</p> <p>* The application must parse attacker-controlled protobuf Text Format input with `protobufjs/ext/textformat`. * The target schema must contain a string-keyed map field. * The crafted input must provide a map entry with key `__proto__`. * Downstream application logic must treat inherited properties on the returned map object as meaningful f…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: protobufjs</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The protobuf.js text format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment. A text-format map entry with key `__proto__` could therefore change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry.</p> <p>This affected the optional Text Format extension. Other protobufjs input paths, including binary decode, `fromObject`, and ProtoJSON conversion, are not affected.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An attacker who can provide protobuf text-format input parsed by an application using `protobufjs/ext/textformat` may be able to create message objects whose string-keyed map fields have attacker-controlled prototypes.</p> <p>This is per-object prototype mutation, not global `Object.prototype` pollution. Impact depends on downstream application logic treating inherited properties as meaningful, for example by using `in`, truthiness checks, or direct property access on parsed map objects instead of own-property checks.</p> <p>Applications that do not parse untrusted Text Format input, or that do not use inherited properties from parsed map objects in security-relevant logic, are not directly affected.</p> <p>## Preconditions</p> <p>* The application must parse attacker-controlled protobuf Text Format input with `protobufjs/ext/textformat`. * The target schema must contain a string-keyed map field. * The crafted input must provide a map entry with key `__proto__`. * Downstream application logic must treat inherited properties on the returned map object as meaningful f…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfj6-75fj-8934