https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 12:00:26 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335527 EUVD-2026-335527 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335527 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59216 <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, get_event_call delivered execute:python and execute:tool Socket.IO events to a client-supplied session_id after checking only that the session was connected, allowing authenticated users who learned another socket ID through ydoc:document:join to run code interpreter Python or tools in that user session. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p> <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, get_event_call delivered execute:python and execute:tool Socket.IO events to a client-supplied session_id after checking only that the session was connected, allowing authenticated users who learned another socket ID through ydoc:document:join to run code interpreter Python or tools in that user session. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59216 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-74h3-cxq7-vc5q <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside **another** user&#39;s authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (`get_event_call`) delivers `execute:python` / `execute:tool` events to a **client-supplied** `session_id` after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with `ydoc:document:join`, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note&#39;s collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim&#39;s session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim&#39;s browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).</p> <p>## Affected component</p> <p>- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — `get_event_call()` / `__event_caller__` - `backend/open_webui/main.py` — chat-completion metadata (`session_id` taken from the request body)</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:</p> <p>```python # backend/open_webui/socket/main.py — get_event_call() async def __event_caller__(event_data): session_id = request_info[&#39;session_id&#39;] if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected return {&#39;error&#39;: &#39;Client session disconnected.&#39;} return await sio.call(&#39;events…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside **another** user&#39;s authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (`get_event_call`) delivers `execute:python` / `execute:tool` events to a **client-supplied** `session_id` after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with `ydoc:document:join`, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note&#39;s collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim&#39;s session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim&#39;s browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).</p> <p>## Affected component</p> <p>- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — `get_event_call()` / `__event_caller__` - `backend/open_webui/main.py` — chat-completion metadata (`session_id` taken from the request body)</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:</p> <p>```python # backend/open_webui/socket/main.py — get_event_call() async def __event_caller__(event_data): session_id = request_info[&#39;session_id&#39;] if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected return {&#39;error&#39;: &#39;Client session disconnected.&#39;} return await sio.call(&#39;events…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-74h3-cxq7-vc5q https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3592 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside **another** user&#39;s authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (`get_event_call`) delivers `execute:python` / `execute:tool` events to a **client-supplied** `session_id` after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with `ydoc:document:join`, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note&#39;s collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim&#39;s session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim&#39;s browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).</p> <p>## Affected component</p> <p>- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — `get_event_call()` / `__event_caller__` - `backend/open_webui/main.py` — chat-completion metadata (`session_id` taken from the request body)</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:</p> <p>```python # backend/open_webui/socket/main.py — get_event_call() async def __event_caller__(event_data): session_id = request_info[&#39;session_id&#39;] if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected return {&#39;error&#39;: &#39;Client session disconnected.&#39;} return await sio.call(&#39;events…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>An authenticated low-privilege user can execute arbitrary code-interpreter Python and tools inside **another** user&#39;s authenticated session. The Socket.IO event-caller (`get_event_call`) delivers `execute:python` / `execute:tool` events to a **client-supplied** `session_id` after only checking that the session is connected, never that it belongs to the requester. Combined with `ydoc:document:join`, which exposes the live socket ids of everyone in a shared note&#39;s collaboration room to any read-access participant, an attacker can target a victim&#39;s session and run attacker-chosen code/tools in the victim&#39;s browser context. When the victim is an administrator, that hijacked context reaches the admin-only Functions API, whose source is executed server-side, yielding remote code execution as the server process (root in the default container).</p> <p>## Affected component</p> <p>- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — `get_event_call()` / `__event_caller__` - `backend/open_webui/main.py` — chat-completion metadata (`session_id` taken from the request body)</p> <p>## Root cause</p> <p>The event-caller routes to a caller-controlled session id with no ownership check:</p> <p>```python # backend/open_webui/socket/main.py — get_event_call() async def __event_caller__(event_data): session_id = request_info[&#39;session_id&#39;] if session_id not in SESSION_POOL: # only checks the session is connected return {&#39;error&#39;: &#39;Client session disconnected.&#39;} return await sio.call(&#39;events…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3592