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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-333339</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333339</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-333339</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-58424</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Permanent Fork PR Workflow Approval Gate Bypass&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Permanent Fork PR Workflow Approval Gate Bypass&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58424</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-777r-4v59-6486 — Gitea: Permanent Fork PR Workflow Approval Gate Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-777r-4v59-6486</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.gitea.io/gitea&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Identifier (researcher-assigned)** | GITEA-2026-004 |
| **Product** | Gitea (self-hosted Git service) |
| **Component** | Gitea Actions — fork pull request approval gate |
| **Affected versions** | All Gitea releases **`v1.20.0` and later**, including the latest `main` (`1.27.0+dev-289-gb7e95cc48c`). The buggy logic was introduced in commit `edf98a2dc3` — *&amp;#34;Require approval to run actions for fork pull request (#22803)&amp;#34;*, 2023-02-24 — and has shipped unchanged since. |
| **Fixed in** | not yet (this disclosure) |
| **Authentication required** | Yes — one unprivileged Gitea account capable of forking the target repository (the default ability for every authenticated user) |
| **User interaction required** | Exactly **once** — a repository administrator must approve a single benign fork PR&amp;#39;s workflow run from the attacker. After that, *no further interaction is ever required* for any future fork PR from the same attacker on the same repository. |
| **Discovered by** | Prakhar Porwal — `prakharporwal2004@gmail.com` |
| **Live-verified on** | Gitea `main` at commit `b7e95cc48cc0e0d6fe24c89bb83da5b84a74490f`, 2026-05-24 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 1. Executive summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gitea Actions enforces an approval gate on workflow runs triggered by fork pull requests, so that an untrusted contributor cannot execute arbitrary workflow YAML on the maintainer&amp;#39;s runner infrastructure without explicit consent. The gate is implemented by `ifNeedApproval()` in `services/acti…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: code.gitea.io/gitea&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Identifier (researcher-assigned)** | GITEA-2026-004 |
| **Product** | Gitea (self-hosted Git service) |
| **Component** | Gitea Actions — fork pull request approval gate |
| **Affected versions** | All Gitea releases **`v1.20.0` and later**, including the latest `main` (`1.27.0+dev-289-gb7e95cc48c`). The buggy logic was introduced in commit `edf98a2dc3` — *&amp;#34;Require approval to run actions for fork pull request (#22803)&amp;#34;*, 2023-02-24 — and has shipped unchanged since. |
| **Fixed in** | not yet (this disclosure) |
| **Authentication required** | Yes — one unprivileged Gitea account capable of forking the target repository (the default ability for every authenticated user) |
| **User interaction required** | Exactly **once** — a repository administrator must approve a single benign fork PR&amp;#39;s workflow run from the attacker. After that, *no further interaction is ever required* for any future fork PR from the same attacker on the same repository. |
| **Discovered by** | Prakhar Porwal — `prakharporwal2004@gmail.com` |
| **Live-verified on** | Gitea `main` at commit `b7e95cc48cc0e0d6fe24c89bb83da5b84a74490f`, 2026-05-24 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 1. Executive summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gitea Actions enforces an approval gate on workflow runs triggered by fork pull requests, so that an untrusted contributor cannot execute arbitrary workflow YAML on the maintainer&amp;#39;s runner infrastructure without explicit consent. The gate is implemented by `ifNeedApproval()` in `services/acti…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-777r-4v59-6486</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2149 — Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2149</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2149</guid>
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