https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:42:45 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-bump-my-version-cve-2026-58203 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: bump-my-version</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:</p> <p>* The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob(&#39;**/*&#39;)`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f&#39;{path}/**/*&#39;, recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.</p> <p>Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:</p> <p>1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 /…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: bump-my-version</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:</p> <p>* The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob(&#39;**/*&#39;)`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f&#39;{path}/**/*&#39;, recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.</p> <p>Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:</p> <p>1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 /…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-bump-my-version-cve-2026-58203 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-iu24971 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: airflow-3</p> <p>Package airflow-3 version 3.2.2-r1 fixes 16 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-59885, CVE-2026-59886, CVE-2026-59884, CVE-2026-59939, CVE-2026-54590...</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: airflow-3</p> <p>Package airflow-3 version 3.2.2-r1 fixes 16 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-59885, CVE-2026-59886, CVE-2026-59884, CVE-2026-59939, CVE-2026-54590...</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-iu24971 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333384 EUVD-2026-333384 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333384 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58203 <p>pydantic-settings provides settings management using Pydantic. From 2.12.0 until 2.14.2, NestedSecretsSettingsSource reads secret values from files in a configured secrets_dir. When secrets_nested_subdir=True, a directory entry inside secrets_dir that is a symbolic link pointing outside secrets_dir is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented secrets_dir_max_size protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.2.</p> <p>pydantic-settings provides settings management using Pydantic. From 2.12.0 until 2.14.2, NestedSecretsSettingsSource reads secret values from files in a configured secrets_dir. When secrets_nested_subdir=True, a directory entry inside secrets_dir that is a symbolic link pointing outside secrets_dir is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented secrets_dir_max_size protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58203 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-settings</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:</p> <p>* The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob(&#39;**/*&#39;)`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f&#39;{path}/**/*&#39;, recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.</p> <p>Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:</p> <p>1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 /…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-settings</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:</p> <p>* The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob(&#39;**/*&#39;)`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f&#39;{path}/**/*&#39;, recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.</p> <p>Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:</p> <p>1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 /…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73929 <p>libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling github.com/pallets/click: Pallets Click: Arbitrary command execution via command injection in click.edit() sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from oversized media files urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion msgpack: MessagePack for Python: Den…</p> <p>libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling github.com/pallets/click: Pallets Click: Arbitrary command execution via command injection in click.edit() sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from oversized media files urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion msgpack: MessagePack for Python: Den…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73929 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-58203 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:25.10: pydantic-settings, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pydantic-settings</p> <p>pydantic-settings provides settings management using Pydantic. From 2.12.0 until 2.14.2, NestedSecretsSettingsSource reads secret values from files in a configured secrets_dir. When secrets_nested_subdir=True, a directory entry inside secrets_dir that is a symbolic link pointing outside secrets_dir is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented secrets_dir_max_size protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:25.10: pydantic-settings, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pydantic-settings</p> <p>pydantic-settings provides settings management using Pydantic. From 2.12.0 until 2.14.2, NestedSecretsSettingsSource reads secret values from files in a configured secrets_dir. When secrets_nested_subdir=True, a directory entry inside secrets_dir that is a symbolic link pointing outside secrets_dir is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented secrets_dir_max_size protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-58203